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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over the above-entitled matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to continue the June 20, 1999 trial 
date or to dismiss Plaintiff/Appellant Joseph W. Rohan's (herein "Rohan" or "Plaintiff) 
case without prejudice? 
Standard of Review: The Appellate Court's review of a trial court's decision to grant 
or deny a continuance is conducted under the abuse of discretion standard. Christenson v. 
Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 1988). Likewise, this Court's review of a trial court's 
decision to grant or deny a request for voluntary dismissal is also done pursuant to the abuse 
of discretion standard. Harmon v. Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636 (Utah 1979); The applicability 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act to the present circumstances is reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). This issue was preserved for the 
court's review by Rohan's "Motion for Continuance of Trial Setting, Withdrawal of Counsel, 
Substitution of Counsel, and Enlargement of Discovery," dated June 2, 2000 (herein also 
referred to as "June 2nd motion" or "first motion to continue") as well as the trial court's 
June 5, 2000 Minute Entry Ruling denying the motion. The issue is separately preserved 
pursuant to Rohan's "Motion for Voluntary Dismissal and Motion to Expedite," dated June 
7,2000 (herein also referred to as "June 7th motion" or first motion to dismiss") and the trial 
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court's June 20, 2000 Order denying that motion. Finally, the matter is preserved under 
Rohan's June 19,2000 "Renewed Motion for Voluntary Dismissal and Motion for Expedited 
Disposition or Alternatively Motion to Continue Trial Setting to Consider Plaintiffs Claims 
Under the ADA," (herein also referred to as "June 19th motion" or "second motion to 
dismiss" or "second motion to continue") and the trial court's July 31, 2001 "Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law" and "Order and Judgment" denying the Plaintiffs June 19 
motion. 
2. Did the trial court's denial of Rohan's motions to continue, to voluntarily dismiss, for 
a new trial or to amend pleadings violate his due process or equal protection rights? 
Standard of Review: Constitutional issues involve questions of law which are 
reviewed by this Court for correctness. Whitmer v. City of Lindon, 943 P.2d 226 (Utah 
1997). 
This issue was preserved for this Court's review by Rohan's June 19,2000 "Renewed 
Motion for Voluntary Dismissal and Motion for Expedited Disposition or Alternatively 
Motion to Continue Trial Setting to Consider Plaintiffs Claims Under the ADA," and the 
trial court's July 31, 2001 "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law" and "Order and 
Judgment" denying the Plaintiffs June 19th motion. The issue was also preserved by 
Rohan's "Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Rule 59 or Alternatively Motion to Amend" 
(herein also referred to as "motion for new trial" or "motion to amend" or "August 7th 
motion") and the trial court's November 2, 2000 order denying Plaintiffs motion. 
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3. Did the trial court act improperly in involuntarily dismissing Plaintiffs case for failing 
to prosecute the matter? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review adopted for purposes of an appellate 
court reviewing a trial courts decision to involuntarily dismiss a case because of a parties 
failure to prosecute falls under the abuse of discretion standard. Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 
765 (Utah 1980). 
This issue was preserved pursuant to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law as well 
as the Order and Judgment entered by the trial court on July 31, 2000. 
4. Did the trial court act appropriately in awarding attorney's fees and costs against the 
Plaintiff? 
Standard of Review: The appellate court applies a multiple standard in evaluating 
a decision to award attorney's fees under U.C.A. §78-27-56. As to whether a claim asserted 
was without merit, the appellate court reviews the same for correctness. Wardley Better 
Homes and Garden v. Cannon, 21 P.3d 235 (Utah App. 2001). As to the second prong 
necessary for the award of attorney's fees, bad faith, that issue is a factual question which is 
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 20 P.3d 868 
(Utah 2000). 
This issue is preserved for appellate review pursuant to the July 31, 2000, Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and the Order of Judgment entered by the trial court. 
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5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in rejecting Plaintiffs motion for a new trial or 
to amend? 
Standard of Review: An appellate court examines a trial court's decision to grant or 
deny a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure under an 
abuse of discretion standard. Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1988); The 
applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act to the present circumstances is reviewed 
for correctness. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The issues addressed in this appeal are governed by: 
1. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 
2. Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
3. Rule 41 (a)(2)(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
4. Rule 59(a) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
5. Rule 4-506 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 
6. Rule 4-105 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
7. United States Code Service §12131 
8. United States Code Service §12132 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The original cause of action in this matter was brought by way of a complaint filed 
by the Plaintiff Joseph W. Rohan against Defendants Chad Boseman and Jerald Boseman on 
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April 23,1998. The complaint was brought to recover for alleged injuries sustained by Rohan 
in a vehicular accident involving Rohan and Chad Boseman in January 1997. 
Plaintiff claimed injuries resulting from the accident with Boseman, including a closed 
head injury. At the time of the filing of the Complaint Rohan was represented by Paul M. 
Halliday Jr. and Stephen B. Watkins of Halliday & Watkins, a legal firm with which Rohan 
practiced law. 
Plaintiff filed a certificate of readiness for trial on January 19, 2000. Defendants' 
council objected to Plaintiffs certificate on February 1, 2001, asserting to the court that 
Plaintiff had yet to provide requested documentation and that Plaintiff s deposition could not 
be completed until the documentation was provided. 
The trial court scheduled a telephone conference for the matter on March 2, 2000. 
During the conference the court established a schedule for the case including a discovery 
cutoff of May 26, 2000, a final pretrial for June 5, 2000 and trial for June 20-23, 2001. 
On June 2,2001, less than three weeks before trial, Rohan's legal counsel filed with 
the trial court a "Motion for Continuance of Trial Setting, Withdrawal of Counsel, 
Substitution of Counsel, and Enlargement of Discovery." The motion essentially requested 
the Court continue the matter so that Rohan could substitute attorneys and acquire additional 
time for identifying and designating previously undisclosed witnesses and exhibits. Plaintiffs 
counsel argued the motion before the Court at the final pretrial on June 5, 2000. The Court 
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subsequently denied the motion declaring that Rohan had failed to show good cause why the 
continuance should be granted. 
Even though the Court had rejected Rohan's motion to continue at the June 5,2000, 
hearing, he fired his attorney a day later on June 6, 2000. 
A second motion was filed by Rohan, pro se, on June 7, 2001. This "Motion for 
Voluntary Dismissal and Motion for Expedited Disposition" was opposed by the Defendant. 
The trial court denied Plaintiffs second motion as well and entered an order consistent with 
the denial on June 20th. 
The day before trial, June 19, 2000, Rohan filed a "Motion for Voluntary Dismissal, 
Motion for Expedited Disposition or Alternatively Motion to Continue Trial Setting to 
Consider Plaintiffs Claims Under the ADA." Plaintiffs motion essentially argued that 
Rohan was entitled to a voluntary dismissal of the case or a continuance of the trial date 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act inasmuch as he had no legal counsel and was 
unable to represent himself as a result of his "disability". The Defendants opposed Plaintiffs 
third motion. 
On the following day, the day of trial, the parties appeared before the trial court. 
Defendants were present and prepared to move forward with the trial. Rohan was also 
present, pro se, but was unprepared to call witnesses or otherwise proceed with the trial. The 
parties argued Plaintiffs third motion. The Court denied Plaintiffs motion to voluntarily 
dismiss or continue trial under the ADA declaring that the ADA was both factually and 
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legally inapplicable to the present circumstance. Inasmuch as Rohan expressed an inability 
to proceed with trial, the trial court granted a defense request to dismiss the Plaintiffs case 
for failure to prosecute. The dismissal was with prejudice and on the merits. The trial court 
also awarded the defense costs and fees from the Plaintiff and further ordered Plaintiff to pay 
the expense of the jurors being brought to the court that morning. 
The trial court issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law as well as an Order and 
Judgment consistent with its ruling from the bench on the day of trial. The "Findings" and 
Order and Judgment were entered on July 31, 2000. 
The Plaintiff filed a "Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Rule 59 or Alternatively 
Motion to Amend" on August 7,2000. The supporting memorandum essentially argued that 
the trial court committed error in concluding Rohan was not entitled to a continuance or 
voluntary dismissal as a result of his disability. It again suggested that the American with 
Disabilities Act applied and that the court had discriminated against Rohan by not granting 
his prior motions. The Defendants opposed Plaintiffs motion for a new trail or amendment 
and the trial court denied the motion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Joseph Rohan and the Defendant Chad Boseman were involved an in automobile 
accident on January 27, 1997 in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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2. Plaintiff is a licensed attorney with the Utah State Bar and has practiced with the firm 
ofHalliday & Watkins since at least the instigation of this lawsuit. Pg. 526:4; 472-14 
and337.] 
3. Since the time of the January 1997 accident Plaintiff has continued to practice law, 
including acquiring and representing new clients, filing pleadings and motions with 
the Utah Courts and conducting trials. Pgs. 472-74 and 480-88. 
4. At all times pertinent to this litigation Plaintiff has been a member of good standing 
with the Utah State Bar (herein "Bar") and licensed to practice law without restriction. 
Pgs. 472-74 
5. Between 1998 and 1999, Rohan unilaterally contacted the Utah State Bar's Office of 
Professional Conduct to discuss his alleged injuries and disability resulting from the 
January 1997 accident. After evaluating the information and representations made by 
Plaintiff concerning his disability, and its impact on his ability to practice law, the 
Bar's Office of Professional Conduct decided not to initiate private or public 
disability proceedings against the Plaintiff. Pg. 472-74. 
6. On April 28, 1999, Rohan filed a complaint in the trial court alleging negligence by 
the Defendants and claiming damages for injuries allegedly sustained in the accident, 
including a purported closed head injury. Pg. 1-5. 
1
 All page citations are to the trial court record. 
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Plaintiffs counsel at the time the lawsuit was instigated were Paul M. Halliday and 
Stephen B. Watkins of the firm Halliday & Watkins, the firm with which Plaintiff is 
affiliated and practiced law. Pgs. 1-5. 
On August 17, 1999 Plaintiff, through counsel, corresponded with the Defendants' 
counsel and stated Plaintiffs intent to terminate settlement negotiations and bring this 
case to trial. Pg. 337. 
On October 28,1999, approximately a year and half following filing of the complaint, 
the trial court, upon its own motion ordered the parties to this action to appear and 
show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Pg. 94. 
On November 18, 1999 the trial court held the Order to Show cause. Upon hearing 
the comments of counsel for the parties the trial judge stated an expectation that 
certificates indicating readiness for trial would be filed within sixty (60) days. Pg. 96. 
Plaintiff, through counsel, filed a certificate indicating his readiness to proceed to trial 
on January 19, 2000. Pg. 97-99 
On February 1, 2000, Defendants filed an objection to Plaintiffs "Certificate of 
Readiness for Trial" asserting that Plaintiff had refused to provide requested 
documentation in Plaintiffs possession, including, but not limited to, documents 
concerning Plaintiffs claim of lost earning. Moreover, Defendants indicated to the 
trial court that they had been unable to complete Plaintiffs deposition as a result of 
the Plaintiffs failure to make the requested documents available. Pgs. 100-102 
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13. In response to Plaintiffs "Certificate" and Defendants' "Objection," on February 2, 
2000 the trial court issued a notice of a telephone conference to be held on March 2, 
2000. The notice indicated that during the conference the following topics would be 
discussed: "trial dates, discovery completion dates, jury or non-jury trail, trial length, 
dates for dispositive motions, dates for exchange of witness lists, nature and 
complexity of case, final pretrial date and settlement status." Pg. 103-105 
14. On March 2, 2000 the trial court held its telephonic conference with the parties in 
which Plaintiff, Plaintiffs counsel Stephen B. Watkins both participated. Pgs. 110-
114. 
15. At the time of the conference the trial court and parties agreed to the following 
schedule: 
Final Pretrial Conference: June 5, 2000 
Jury Trial: June 20-23, 2000 
Witness and exhibit designation: Plaintiff-March 16, 2000 and Defendants-
March 23, 2000 
Discovery cutoff: May 26, 2000 
Pgs. 110-114. 
16. The trial court also issued an entry to the court's file and to the parties identifying the 
above dates and further stating: "The foregoing dates should be considered firm 
settings and will not be modified without court order, and then only upon a showing 
of manifest injustice." Pg. 112. 
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17. According to Plaintiff, following the March 2, 2000 pretrial conference he began 
searching for new trial counsel inasmuch as his prior counsel had limited trial 
experience and never tried a brain injury case. Pg. 191-194 
18. In March 2000, Plaintiff apparently contacted Robert F. Orton of the law office of 
Fabian & Clendenin who agreed to represent him in this matter. Pg. 207-209 
19. Notwithstanding any agreement Plaintiff may have reached with him, Mr. Orton never 
entered an appearance in the case, although he did attend the supplemental deposition 
of the Plaintiff. Pg. 448 and 479 
20. On June 2, 2000, two and a half weeks before trial, Plaintiff filed with the trial court 
a "Motion for Continuance of Trial Setting, Withdrawal of Counsel, Substitution of 
Counsel and Enlargement of Time." The motion essentially requested that the trial 
court continue the trial for ninety (90) days so that Robert F. Orton could appear as 
counsel in place of Paul Halliday and Stephen Watkins and that, discovery be allowed 
to continue for sixty (60) days in order for Plaintiff to supplement his prior 
designation of exhibits and witnesses. Pgs. 184-190. 
21. The Defendants refused to stipulate to Plaintiffs June 2nd motion but did not object 
toit.Pg. 196-98. 
22. At the final pretrial three days later, June 5, 2000, Plaintiff appeared with counsel, 
Stephen B. Watkins. Mr. Watkins renewed Plaintiffs motion to continue the trial date, 
allow the substitution of counsel and extend witness designation dates. The trial court 
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indicated to the parties at that time that it would take Plaintiffs motion under 
advisement, but further stated that Plaintiff and his counsel should continue to prepare 
for trial in the event said motion was denied. Pgs. 195 and 338 
23. Later that same day, the Court issued a Minute Entry Ruling denying Plaintiff motion 
to continue, to substitute counsel or extend discovery or witness designation. In said 
ruling the trial court noted that Plaintiff had used the same counsel since the 
instigation of the litigation, that a decision to change counsel fifteen (15) days before 
trial was too late and further found that the Plaintiff had failed to show good cause for 
the continuance. Pgs. 196-98. 
24. Notwithstanding the trial court's ruling on Plaintiffs motion for 
continuance/substitution, the following day, June 6,2000, Plaintiff gave notice to the 
court and the Defendants that he had discharged his attorney's Stephen B. Watkins, 
Paul M. Halliday, Jr. and the law firm of Halliday and Watkins as his legal counsel 
in this matter. Pgs. 199-200. 
25. On June 7, 2000, Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed with the trial court a "Motion for 
Voluntary Dismissal and Motion to Expedite." Plaintiffs June 7th motion asked the 
court to dismiss the Plaintiffs complaint, without prejudice. In his supporting 
memorandum, Plaintiff argued that he was unable to proceed to trial because he 
lacked legal counsel and had a brain injury. He requested the court allow him to 
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voluntarily dismiss so that new counsel could re-file the cause of action and again 
prepare the matter for trial. Pgs. 201-206. 
26. The Defendants opposed Plaintiffs motion for voluntary dismissal. Pgs. 210-214. 
27. On June 14, 2000, the trial court issued a Minute Entry Ruling denying Plaintiffs 
motion for voluntary dismissal for the reasons set forth in the Defendants' opposing 
memorandum. Pgs. 230-231. An order consistent with the court's ruling was entered 
on June 20, 2000. Pgs. 309-10. 
28. Also on June 14, 2000, Plaintiff, pro se, corresponded with Defendants' counsel 
indicating his intention to file an interlocutory appeal in order to stay the trial date. 
His correspondence also stated: " I also want to inform you that whether or not a stay 
is granted, a trial will not occur on Tuesday and therefore the defense does not need 
to expend time and effort in preparation of trial on that date." Pg. 340. 
29. On June 15, 2000, Defendants' counsel wrote back to Plaintiff indicating the 
Defendants intent to continue preparation for trial absent an order from the trial or an 
appellate court striking the trial scheduled for June 20-23, 2000. The letter also 
indicated that if Plaintiff refused to move the case forward at trial that the Defendants 
would request the trial court impose sanctions against the Plaintiff. Pgs. 340; 268-69. 
30. On June 19,2000 Plaintiff filed, pro se, a "Renewed Motion for Voluntary Dismissal 
and Motion for Expedited Disposition or Alternatively Motion to Continue Trial 
Setting To Consider Plaintiffs Claims Under the ADA." The June 19th motion 
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argued that Plaintiff was disabled and because of the absence of counsel for the 
Plaintiff the Court's failure to voluntarily dismiss the case or to continue the trial 
would be discriminatory. Pgs. 284-293; 340-341. 
31. Plaintiff and Defendant's counsel argued Plaintiffs June 19th motion. The Court 
denied the motion concluding that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act is 
legally and factually inapplicable to the present case and that the Act did not require 
the trial court to continue the trial or voluntarily dismiss the case without prejudice. 
Pgs. 526:1-7; 342 
32. The following day, the first morning of trial, Plaintiff appeared pro se, and the 
Defendants appeared with their counsel. Defendants were prepared to try the defense 
of the case. Pg. 341. 
33. As of June 20, 2000 the trial court had not entered any order permitting withdrawal 
of Stephen Watkins or Paul Halliday as counsel for Plaintiff as required by Rule 4-
506(1) or (5) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. Pg. 341. 
34. On the morning of trial, Plaintiff appeared unprepared and/or unwilling to proceed 
with the trial or the calling of witnesses on his own behalf and stated in open court 
that he was not prepared to proceed with the presentation of his evidence. Pgs. 526:1-
7; 341. 
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35. As a result of Plaintiff s failure to prosecute his case, either pro se or through counsel, 
the Court dismissed Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice and upon the merits. Pgs. 
526:1-7; 344-45; 302. 
36. The trial court also concluded that Plaintiff s failure to prosecute the case was without 
merit and in bad faith and was done with the purpose to hinder or delay the 
proceedings of the court. Pgs. 526:1-7; 336-45. 
37. The trial court awarded the Defendants costs of court and attorney's fees from the 
Plaintiff and further ordered the Plaintiff to reimburse the court for the costs 
associated with calling the jurors in this case. Pgs. 526:1-7; 336-45; 302. 
38. On July 31,2000 the trial court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an 
Order and Judgment consistent with its ruling of June 20, 2000. Pgs. 336-45. 
39. On August 7, 2000, Plaintiff filed a "Motion for New Trial or Alternatively to 
Amend." Plaintiffs motion argued that the trial court had discriminated against him 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act by refusing to continue the June 20,2000 
trial setting or by refusing to permit the voluntary dismissal of the case, without 
prejudice. Pgs. 350-378. 
40. The Defendants opposed Plaintiffs August 7th motion asserting that the ADA was 
inapplicable to the present circumstances and that Plaintiff failed to "qualify" for 
protection under the ADA. Pgs. 345-487. 
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41. On September 28, 2000 the trial court issued a Minute Entry Ruling denying 
Plaintiffs August 7, 2000 motion for the reasons set forth in the Defendants' 
opposing memorandum. Pgs. 507-08. 
42. On November 2, 2000, the trial court entered an order consistent with its September 
28, 2000 ruling. Pgs. 509-10. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Motion to permit Rohan to continue the trial and substitute counsel provided no 
evidence of good cause. The legal counsel which Rohan originally employed to prosecute 
and try this case apparently did not have the trial experience Rohan wanted; however, 
Plaintiff knew this when he originally hired them. Thereafter Rohan made no substantial 
effort to prepare or arrange the appearance of new counsel until eighteen (18) days before 
trial. Plaintiff knew the trial date was fast approaching. He had indicated to the trial court and 
to Defendants' counsel on separate occasions that he was preparing and ready for trial. If 
those representations were true, then the trial court properly concluded that the Plaintiff could 
put on his case on the scheduled trial date. If Plaintiff had misrepresented his level of 
preparation, then the trial court properly determined that he had had over 25 months to 
prepare his case and should not be rewarded for being dilatory. 
The trial court's decision to deny Rohan's first motion to voluntarily dismiss the case 
without prejudice was appropriately denied for the same reason as the motion to continue. 
Plaintiff indicated in his supporting memorandum that he intended to get new counsel and 
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rapidly re-file the case. However, the court concluded Rohan's failure to request the relief 
until an extraordinarily late date, as well as his unilateral attempt to sabotage his 
representation was improper. To dismiss only two weeks before trial would have placed 
substantial prejudice on the Defendants, who had incurred the costs of preparation and were 
ready to try the case. Finally, Plaintiff still had available to him whatever legal case he had 
prepared in the preceding 25 months as well as the assistance his counsel of record, Paul 
Halliday and Stephen Watkins, to present his cause of action at trial. 
The above stated rationale is equally applicable in rejecting Rohan's second motion 
to voluntarily dismiss his case or to continue the trial date, set forth in his June 19th motion. 
In addition, however, Rohan argued, at that time, that the trial court was required to grant 
voluntary dismissal or continuance as an appropriate modification of the rules of procedure 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (herein "ADA" or "Act"). Such a modification 
was not required for a plethora of reasons. First, Plaintiff was not a "qualified person with 
a disability" as defined by the ADA. Second, Rohan was never denied access to any benefits 
of the judicial process. He had the right and ability to be heard and acquire justice. Third, any 
concerns which Plaintiff had as to whether his case could be properly presented on June 20-
23, 2001, did not come about as a result of any "disability" under which Plaintiff may have 
been operating. 
Instead of continuing the trial or voluntarily dismissing the case without prejudice the 
trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs case with prejudice, and on the merits, when Rohan 
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refused to present his case on the morning of trial. Plaintiff had received numerous warnings 
from the trial court and the Defendants as to when he needed to be ready for trial. 
Notwithstanding the substantial time which Rohan had to prepare, he failed to line up the 
evidence and witnesses necessary to present his case. On the morning of trial, with the jury 
present, Plaintiff indicated to the court that he was unprepared to proceed. Nobody besides 
Plaintiff has the responsibility of preparing his case. If a Plaintiff chooses not to prepare or 
is dilatory in doing so, as is the present case, the court can and should dismiss his action with 
prejudice. 
Plaintiff s August 7th motion for a new trial or to amend was also appropriately denied 
by the trial court. Rohan's assertion that the ADA required the trial court to modify it rules 
and procedures for his benefit is without basis. Rohan does not even qualify under the Act, 
even if he is accurate that he has a brain injury. Besides, the trial court gave Rohan ever 
opportunity to present his case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO CONTINUE THE PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED TRIAL 
AND IN REJECTING PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST TO VOLUNTARILY 
DISMISS HIS COMPLIANT WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
The Plaintiff in this matter made two separate requests to the trial court that the trial 
date be continued and two separate requests that the case be voluntarily dismissed without 
prejudice. The initial motion to continue and motion for voluntarily dismissal was made 
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separately within 18 days of trial. The second motion to continue or to voluntarily dismiss 
the case was made jointly within 24 hours of the scheduled commencement of trial. 
Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do allow the trial court to continue 
a trial or other proceeding at its discretion. The rule specifically states: 
Upon motion of a party, the court may in its discretion , and upon such terms as may 
be just, including the payment of costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone 
a trial or proceeding upon good cause shown.2 
Similarly Rule 41 (a)(2)(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits the trial court 
to voluntarily dismiss a case without prejudice "upon such terms and conditions as the court 
deems proper." The decision to grant such a dismissal is at the trial court's discretion. 
Harmon v. Greenwood. 596 P.2d 636 (Utah 1979). 
A. Plaintiff Failed to Demonstrate Good Cause to the Trial Court in Order 
to Receive the Requested Continuances. 
Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the Plaintiff demonstrate 
some form of good cause for the trial court to grant a continuance of the trial date in this 
matter. Rohan failed to do so. A review of the motion, memorandum, and affidavit in support 
of Plaintiff s original motion shows no reasonable basis upon which the Court could find a 
continuance to be appropriate. The memorandum and affidavit indicate that Rohan's 
rationale for requesting the continuance is exclusively limited to his realization that he needs 
new legal counsel to help him present his brain injury case. Whether or not Plaintiff would 
2It should be noted that in denying Plaintiffs second motion to continue the trial court 
specifically relied upon Rule 4-105(3) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, which is 
similar in scope and review to 40(b). See, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, p.342. 
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have been better served by new legal counsel is not the question. Such may or may not have 
been the case. Regardless, Rohan's delay in attempting to arrange new counsel to appear in 
this case until eighteen (18) days before trial is clearly insufficient to establish good cause. 
By the time the initial request for continuance had been made Rohan's case had been 
pending for almost 26 months. Certainly somewhere during that period Rohan should have 
recognized the need for legal counsel that could present his issues to judge and jury in a 
manner which he found acceptable. Nevertheless, Rohan delayed until shortly before trial 
before even making an effort to involve the counsel of his choice. The trial court found this 
to be too late. This rationale for denying Plaintiffs initial motion to continue is clearly within 
the trial court's discretion. Christensen v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 1988). In 
Christensen, the Court further indicated that such a decision rendered by the trial court will 
not be disturbed unless the trial court abused its discretion by acting unreasonably.. It should 
be noted that in the Christensen case both parties appeared before the trial court and 
stipulated to a continuance. The trial court still denied the request. In the present case, while 
the Defendants did not specifically oppose Plaintiffs initial motion, they certainly refused 
to stipulate to the same. 
1. Plaintiff was Dilatory in Finding and Putting in Place New Counsel. 
The trial court recognized that Plaintiffs delay in exchanging counsel was 
inappropriate and imposed a burden on the time and financial resources of both the court and 
the Bosemans. Further, Rohan still had Mr. Watkins and Mr. Halliday available to present 
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his case. These were the same gentlemen who had represented Rohan from the instigation 
of the matter and had assisted him in preparing this case for trial. The trial court reasonably 
concluded that Mr. Watkins and Mr. Halliday were sufficiently prepared and could 
adequately present Rohan's case at trial. 
Importantly, courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that a continuance on the eve 
of trial for purposes of locating new legal counsel is inappropriate. They have recognized that 
such a continuance would improperly prejudice the remaining parties and court. Siggelkow 
v. Siggelkow. 643 P.2d 985 (Alaska 1982). In Matter of Wong. 827 P.2d 90,252 Mont. 111 
(Mont. 1992) the Montana Supreme Court specifically indicated that in making a decision 
on a request to continue due to lack of counsel, the trial court must first assess whether the 
party petitioning for the continuance has acted diligently in seeking counsel. See also. Modla 
v. Parker. 495 P.2d 494, 17 ArizApp. 54 (Ariz. App. 1972) (Where plaintiff himself created 
a situation of lack of counsel denying continuance was not abuse of discretion on theory that 
at time of denial of continuance of motion plaintiff was without counsel); Cheek v. Hind. 675 
P.2d 935, 9 KanApp.2d 248 (Kan.App. 1984); Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Musgrove. 
796P.2d641 (Okl.App. 1990). 
There is no question in the present case that the Plaintiff procrastinated in acquiring 
new trial counsel. He had almost three and a half years from the time of his accident and 
twenty-five (25) months from the filing of this case to locate and put in place the 
individual(s) he wanted to try his case. Plaintiffs failed to explain to the trial court at the 
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times of his motions to continue, why he did not do so. His only explanation to the trial court 
for wanting to substitute counsel was that the trial experience of Mr. Watkins and Mr. 
Halliday was limited. Defendants do not suggest here whether or not Mr. Watkins and Mr. 
Halliday 's trial experience was significant or limited. However, if their trial experience was 
insufficient to present Plaintiffs case at trial, this was not news to Plaintiff. Mr. Halliday and 
Mr. Watkins are members of Plaintiff s firm. They work together on a regular basis. Plaintiff 
knew the experience of these individuals when he filed his Complaint in April 1998. Even 
if there was a false impression as to their skills prior to filing, Plaintiff then had the next 24 
months to witness their work on his case. Certainly it would not take Plaintiff that entire time 
to recognize their skills were not up to the presentation of his case, if in fact they were not. 
This Court should recall that Plaintiff himself is an attorney. Plaintiff, therefore, is aware of 
what talents and skills are essential for a good trial attorney. He cannot say that he was 
surprised to find out, at the time of trial, that Watkins and Halliday did not have what it 
takes. And yet for over 25 months following filing of this action Plaintiff did nothing as far 
as substituting into this case new legal counsel. 
Rohan does suggest at various points that in March of 2000 he did contact Robert F. 
Orton of the law office of Fabian & Clendenin to substitute in as new counsel. In fact, 
Plaintiffs original motion to continue specifically asked the Court to allow the substitution 
of Mr. Orton. Nevertheless, the motions to continue still fail to explain why Plaintiff delayed 
until two and half weeks before trial to attempt substitution. Why did Plaintiff wait almost 
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two years to even contact Mr. Orton? Why couldn't Mr. Orton prepare for trial with the 
evidence available to Plaintiff, when he had at least three months lead time? Why didn't 
Plaintiff request the substitution of counsel, or if necessary a continuance, until eighteen (18) 
days before trial? All of these questions go to the issue as to whether the Plaintiff was 
diligent in this matter and address the issue of good cause as to the granting of continuance. 
None, however, were addressed by Plaintiff, either in his motions, memoranda and affidavit, 
or in argument before the trial judge. 
2. No "Good Cause" Existed for a Continuance Under Plaintiff s June 19th 
Motion Inasmuch as Plaintiff was Still Represented by Legal Counsel. 
It should be noted that all the arguments made above are as applicable to Plaintiffs 
second request for a continuance, as contained in his June 19th motion, as to the original 
motion of June 2, 2000. The June 19th motion is distinct in that Plaintiffs rationale for the 
continuance changes from the need to substitute more experienced legal counsel to the 
necessity of acquiring any legal counsel. In the two week period between the first and second 
motion to continue Plaintiff had unilaterally terminated his relationship with Halliday and 
Watkins leaving himself without any legal representation. The trial court; however, was 
properly unimpressed with Rohan's cries of prejudice resulting from lack of representation. 
Rohan had adequate representation for over two years. In fact he had two attorney's 
representing him. Two weeks before trial, however, Plaintiff attempted to sabotage that 
representation solely for the purpose of being able to cry "foul" to the trial court. Clearly, the 
trial court could not find good cause in Plaintiffs second request for a continuance. 
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Moreover, pursuant to the law, Plaintiff still had proper representation. Rule 4-506( 1) 
of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration states as follows: 
An attorney may withdraw as counsel or record only upon approval of the court when 
a motion has been filed and the court has not issued an order on the motion or after 
a certificate of readiness for trial has been filed. Under these circumstances, an 
attorney may not withdraw except upon motion and order of the court. 
Subsection (5) of the rule further states, "Where new counsel requests a delay of proceedings, 
substitution of counsel requires the approval of the court as provided in this rule." While 
Halliday and Watkins had requested permission to withdraw and Plaintiff had requested the 
substitution of Mr. Orton, the trial court had rejected both requests as being untimely. 
Consequently, Halliday and Watkins were still acting as counsel for the Plaintiff at the time 
the June 19th motion was considered. 
Plaintiffs second motion to continue also asserted a right to continuance under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. The ADA, however, is inapplicable to the present 
circumstances and did not act as good cause for the granting a continuance as shall be 
discussed more fully below. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Utilized its Discretion in Rejecting Plaintiffs 
Requests to Voluntarily Dismiss the Case Without Prejudice. 
The trial court's decision to deny Plaintiffs motion to voluntarily dismiss his case 
without prejudice was correct for many, if not all, of the same reasons the court rejected 
Rohan's requests to continue. Rule 41(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that 
an action may only be dismissed at the request of the plaintiff by order of the court, "upon 
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such terms and conditions as the court deems proper." The trial court again is granted great 
discretion in determining whether a party should be permitted to voluntarily dismiss a case. 
Harmony. Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636 (Utah 1979). The trial court concluded Rohan's request 
was improper. 
1. The Plaintiff s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal was Unnecessary Since 
he Already Had Both Legal Counsel and Witnesses Available to 
Appear at Trial. 
Plaintiffs initial motion requesting voluntary dismissal was filed June 7, 2000, two 
weeks before trial. Rohan argued to the court that dismissal would be proper as he was 
unrepresented and to proceed to trial would require him to try the case himself. Rohan 
suggested that because of his "brain injury" it would be unjust to require him to try his own 
case. 
Rohan's argument to the Court, however, was in error. Plaintiff was represented by 
counsel. As noted above, Rule 4-506 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure prohibited Mr. 
Watkins and Mr. Halliday from withdrawing from the case absent an order of the trial court 
permitting them from doing so. Such an order was never forthcoming. The request for the 
withdraw of Mr. Watkins and Mr. Halliday had been specifically rejected by the court only 
two days prior to the Defendant's motion. Consequently, they were still legal counsel for the 
Plaintiff and had a legal and ethical obligation to represent Rohan skillfully and diligently. 
The fact that Robert F. Orton was apparently Rohan's attorney of choice at the time 
of the motion was irrelevant. The trial court never restricted Mr. Orton's participation in the 
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case, provided he chose to work within the schedule already established by the court and the 
parties some three months prior. Rohan's affidavit in support of his motion never indicates 
that Mr. Orton could not get up to speed on the case before the morning of trial. Instead, it 
indicates that Mr. Orton "could not schedule the experts he requires in time for June 20,2001 
trial. See, Court Record, Pg.208, f 8. The problem, therefore, is not dissatisfaction with legal 
counsel as much as it was a need to restructure witnesses and experts with which the Plaintiff 
was unsatisfied. 
This Court should again recall that Plaintiff himself is a member of the Utah State Bar. 
Plaintiff was a practicing litigator both prior and subsequent to his accident. While Plaintiff 
argued to the trial court in support of his motions to voluntarily dismiss this matter that his 
brain injury made it impossible for him to try his own case, such indications were self-
serving and misleading. Plaintiff had continued to practice law subsequent to his accident. 
He had acquired new clients and continued to represent them according the Utah Rule of 
Professional Conduct. He had represented clients in court settings and even tried cases since 
his accident. Even with his "brain injury" Rohan was better prepared to represent himself at 
a trial than any number of other pro se complainants who are required to act as their own 
counsel because of preference or lack of finances. 
The Utah State Bar likewise believed Plaintiffs "brain injury" to be sufficiently 
nominal to allow him to continue practicing law. The Bar had investigated Plaintiffs injury 
in 1998-99. Upon review, the Bar's Office of Professional Conduct chose to take no action 
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to restrict Plaintiffs ability to practice law in this state. The OPC didn't even demand that 
Rohan's practice by supervised. Plaintiff contradicts his claim that his brain injury inhibits 
his self-representation at trial by continuing to maintain his own personal law practice which 
includes litigation. 
2. Rohan's Request for Dismissal Without Prejudice on the Eve of Trial 
Resulted from his Own Procrastination in Preparing his Case. 
In the trial court's June 20th order denying Plaintiffs motion for voluntary dismissal 
without prejudice, the Court indicated that the motion was denied for the reasons set forth 
in the Defendants' opposing memorandum. One reason which the Defendants' opposing 
memorandum identifies for rejecting Rohan request to dismiss is that his need to exchange 
counsel two weeks before trial resulted only from Rohan's failure to diligently prepare his 
case. 
Rohan argued to the trial court that Halliday and Watkins had little jury experience 
and never tried a brain injury case. Certainly this wasn't news to Rohan in June 2000. Rohan 
was intimately familiar with the capabilities of his original counsel. He had worked with 
them in the legal field for an extended period of time. He felt sufficiently comfortable with 
their representation at the beginning of the case. He had them prepare him for trial. They 
conducted discovery. They took depositions. They attended pretrial matters before the court. 
Yet it was not until weeks before trial that Plaintiff made any attempt to notify the court or 
the Bosemans of his desire to find new legal counsel. Such notice is insufficient, particularly 
when a change on such a late date will impact both the Defendants and the trial court. 
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Plaintiffs attempted delay by requesting to both continue and voluntarily dismiss this 
action is exacerbated by the fact that he continually represented to the trial court and the 
Defendants that he was actually preparing for trial. On August 17,1999, Plaintiff counsel or 
record corresponded with Defendants counsel terminating settlement negotiations and 
indicating a desire to proceed to trial. Moreover, Plaintiff filed a certificate of readiness for 
trial over five months prior to the date trial was scheduled to commence. It was an 
unfortunate surprise to the court and the Bosemans, therefore, when Rohan indicated that he 
was, in fact, not "ready" to for trial only a few days before trial was to commence. 
Plaintiffs failure to properly prepare his case was particularly unacceptable 
considering the warnings the trial court had previously issued the parties about being ready 
come June 20. The minutes prepared by the court and mailed to the parties, reflecting the 
March 2,2000 pretrial certainly set forth such a warning. The notes identified the June 20-23 
trial dates which the court set in this case. Following the dates the trial court noted, "The 
foregoing dates should be considered firm settings and will not be modified without court 
order, and then only upon a showing of manifest injustice." The Plaintiffs failure to get his 
legal counsel put in place or desire to acquire a new slate of expert witness cannot reasonably 
be argued to constitute "manifest injustice." 
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3. Plaintiffs Requests to Dismiss Without Prejudice Would Have 
Resulted in Prejudice to the Defendants and Imposed a Substantial 
Inconvenience to the Trial Court. 
Plaintiff attempts to argue that the dismissal of his case without prejudice would not 
have imposed any burden on the Defendants. This is incorrect. The trial correct properly 
considered the prejudice to the Defendants that such a dismissal would produce. Utah 
appellate courts have previously recognized the purpose behind the court order requirement 
imposed by Rule 41(a)(2)(h) when contrasted with 41(a)(1). Subsection (1) does not require 
a court order be issued or a stipulation of the parties be reached. The appellate courts have 
indicated that the "order" requirement of 41 (a)(2)(h) is to guard against potential harassment 
and prejudice which results from the inconvenience and investment of time and resources 
subsequently lost when a case is dismissed. Thiele v. Anderson, 975 P.2d 481 (Utah App. 
1999). 
The Bosemans had expended a substantial amount of time and resources preparing for 
trial by June, 2000. They had conducted discovery. They had taken the depositions of 
witnesses which Plaintiff identified as his "experts". They had gathered their own witnesses 
and prepared them for their examination. This is both time and money that could not be 
recovered. Most, if not all, expenditures would have been lost if Rohan would have been 
allowed to dismiss at the last minute. Moreover, Rohan's memorandum and affidavit 
supporting his motions for voluntary dismissal made it clear that new counsel desired to line 
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up his own experts. The Defendants therefore would have been in the position of preparing 
their defense from scratch. 
As noted to the trial court in its opposing memorandum, the Bosemans personally 
incurred many costs just by attending trial. The Defendant Jerald Boseman is a dentist who 
was required to cancel an entire work week in order that he could attend the trial of this 
matter. Had the court allowed Plaintiff to dismiss so close to the time of trial, Mr. Boseman 
would have lost the income of the entire week and then still been required to take another 
week off for trial at some later date. 
As with the multiple motions to continue, Rohan filed multiple requests to voluntarily 
dismiss the case without prejudice. The arguments above apply equally well to both motions. 
However, Plaintiffs June 19th motion to voluntarily dismiss or to continue relied almost 
entirely on Plaintiffs claim that he was entitled to the requested relief under the Americans 
with Disability Act. The ADA claims, however, are irrelevant for the reasons identified 
below. 
C. Plaintiffs Claims for Relief Under the Americans with Disabilities Act are 
Inappropriate by Considered as the Act Does Not Apply to Plaintiff and 
is Inapplicable to the Present Facts. 
The bulk of Rohan's June 19th motion, as well as the argument currently presented by 
Plaintiff to this Court, centers around Rohan's assertion that his "brain injury" entitles him 
to the dismissal or continuance under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Notwithstanding 
the substantial amount of time Plaintiff has spent attempting to make the point, Defendants 
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are not disputing here whether or not Plaintiffs "brain injury" constitutes a "disability" as 
defined by the ADA. Instead, Defendant's position is that even if this Court were to conclude 
that Plaintiff had a disability, it would still be left with no alternative but to conclude that 
Plaintiff fails to qualify for the Act and that the facts and law do not support implementation 
of the Act in any case. 
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act is designed to prevent and 
discrimination of a disabled party by a public entity. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12132 states: 
[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be 
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 
In this case, Plaintiff was permitted to participate in and given the benefits of all the services 
typically available through the Third Judicial District Court. He was not discriminated 
against. 
In order to receive relief under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as 
Plaintiff has requested, Rohan must show: 
(1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; 
(2) that he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of 
some public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise 
discriminated against by the public entity; and 
(3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his 
disability. 
Tvler v. City of Manhattan, 857 F.Supp. 800, 817 (D.Kan. 1994). Rohan is unable to meet 
any of the elements necessary to receive protection under the ADA. 
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1. Rohan is not a "Qualified Individual with a Disability" as Defined By 
the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
In order to receive protection under the Americans with Disabilities Act a party must 
not only be disabled, but must also "qualify". See, 42 U.S.C.S. § 12132; 28 CFR §35.130. 
The definition of a "qualified individual with a disability" is set forth by statute. It is: 
[A]n individual with a disability who with or without reasonable modifications to 
rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or 
transportation barriers, or the provision or auxiliary aids, and services, meets the 
essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in 
programs or activities provided by a public entity. 
42 U.S.C.S. § 12131; 28 CFR 35.104. Again, while the Defendants does not argue here as to 
whether the Plaintiff would fit the "disability" definition3, he clearly does not meet the 
definition for a "qualified individual with a disability." 
Rohan is not a "qualified individual" because he does not meet the essential eligibility 
requirements for the services he is demanding. What are the services he is demanding? That 
the trial court voluntarily dismiss his case without prejudice or grant him a continuance. 
What are the requirements for those services? That the Plaintiff show good cause, that the 
request is proper and that his request does not prejudice the trial court or the remaining 
parties to this case. As previously indicated in this brief, Rohan failed to meet these 
requirements. 
3It should be noted that while the Defendants do not argue the issue as to whether or not 
Rohan is disabled the Defendants do not admit the same. 
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Plaintiff argues that if the trial court modified the Rules of Civil Procedure that he 
would be eligible for relief; however, this in not how the statue defines a "qualified 
individual." To be "qualified" the Plaintiff must be eligible for a dismissal or continuance, 
"with or without reasonable modifications to rules. . . ." 42 U.S.C.S. §12131; 28 CFR 
35.104. Without modifications to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the Plaintiff obviously 
was ineligible for the relief. He provided the trial court no good cause. He failed to prepare 
his case timely by substituting in his preferred counsel and by failing to have the witnesses 
available who he desired to call at trial. Furthermore, he sabotaged his own case by 
terminating his legal counsel two weeks before trial. Even so, he had adequate representation 
if the court properly considers that Watkins and Halliday were still of counsel to the case and 
Plaintiff himself was a member of the Bar. Each of these reasons in and of itself is sufficient 
to prevent the dismissal or continuance and make Rohan ineligible for that particular service 
from the trial court. 
2. Plaintiff Was Not Excluded From Participating In the Judicial Process 
or Otherwise Discriminated Against by the Trial Court. 
Rohan never met the second requirement for implementation of ADA, that he be 
excluded from participation or otherwise discriminated against by the trial court. See, Tyler. 
That Rohan was permitted free and open access to the judicial process cannot be questioned. 
The trial court constitutes a public entity to which Plaintiff is entitled to access. 
Moreover, Plaintiff has the right to be heard and to seek justice before the court. 
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc.. 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 
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1975). However, nothing in the Plaintiffs brief or the trial court record suggests that Rohan 
was denied access or his opportunity to seek justice. The trial court accepted his complaint 
in April 1998 and required the Defendants to appear and defend. The court also allowed 
Plaintiff to utilize its judicial authority to seek discovery, including taking depositions. The 
court nowhere prohibited Rohan from filing motions or seeking other forms of relief. Even 
a jury trial was scheduled for the Plaintiff and jury appeared to hear Plaintiffs case on the 
morning of June 20, 2000. 
Rohan erroneously argues that the requirement of participation or possibility of 
benefits somehow equates to a requirement that the trial court provide him the end result he 
is looking for. The opportunity to be heard and seek justice does not always equate with the 
right to be successful in your request for relief. For example, simply because a party may be 
entitled to apply for social security benefits does not mean that the administration is 
mandated to award them. The Social Security Administration would still be required to 
review its policies and procedures and insure the applicant meet the criteria for payment. 
Even under the ADA there remains an expectation that the justice being sought is the justice 
to which a party is entitled. 
The trial court provided Plaintiff access and the method by which Rohan could acquire 
relief. The court made available to him every opportunity to retain the counsel of his choice. 
Moreover, the court delayed over two years in bringing Rohan's case to trial in order that 
Rohan, and the Defendants, could be prepared with the witnesses and exhibits necessary to 
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present their case. Plaintiff was given an opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence, 
even as late as the first morning of trial. It is not discriminatory for the trial court to expect 
Plaintiff to diligently prepare his case and to approach the court in a timely manner with any 
concerns as to representation. 
3. Any Exclusion, Denial of Benefits or Discrimination Which Plaintiff 
Experienced Resulted From His Dilatory Conduct Not By Reason of 
His "Disability". 
The fact that Plaintiffs June 19th motion for voluntary dismissal or continuance was 
denied by the court did not result from any exclusion of Rohan from the judicial process by 
reason of his disability. Instead, any lack of access to the process came about because 
Plaintiff was dilatory in preparing his case. Plaintiff cannot, therefore, meet the third 
requirement identified by the Tyler court needed to implement Title II of the ADA. Id, at 857 
F.Supp. 800, 817 (D.Kan. 1994). The law imposes the burden of proof as to this element 
upon the Plaintiff. Id. 
The fact that the court continued to provide Rohan access to the judicial process can 
be seen by the fact that the court presented him an opportunity to present his case on the 
morning of trial. Plaintiffs response to the court was that he was unprepared to proceed. 
Plaintiff has argued both to the trial court and this Court that his inability to proceed 
resulted from his lack of legal counsel. However, the record is crystal clear that Rohan's lack 
of representation on the morning or trial resulted not because he was disabled but because 
he discharged his lawyers two weeks prior. His decision to terminate them was not because 
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of his disability or discrimination, but admittedly because his counsel had "limited jury trial 
experience" and lacked the experience required to "properly present his claims." This 
decision by Plaintiff can hardly be suggested to be discriminatory conduct on the part of the 
trial judge. 
Moreover, even on the morning of trial Plaintiff had the legal assistance necessary to 
proceed with the case. Halliday and Watkins were still of counsel to the case, having never 
been released by the Court. Further, the Plaintiff, notwithstanding his cries of disability, was 
still an "active" member of the Utah State Bar continuing to represent his own clients in legal 
proceedings. The indication to the trial court that the matter needed to be continued or 
dismissed resulted more from Plaintiffs tactical predilections rather than any disability. 
The fact of the matter is that Plaintiff simply failed to prepare. He made no effort to 
substitute counsel until just before trial when it would cause the greatest inconvenience to 
the court and the Bosemans. He terminated his original attorneys to intentionally inhibit is 
ability to present his case. 
It is also important to consider Rohan's allegations of prejudice under the ADA in 
light of the fact that he delayed until the day prior to trial to raise the issue with the trial 
court4. Other jurisdictions have imposed the requirement, even on the disabled, that the trial 
4The trial court should take notice of the instructions by the trial court to the parties in this 
matter, including the Plaintiff, in the file note prepared following the March 2, 2000 pretrial. 
Those instructions state, "In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations... during this proceeding should call Third District Court.. .at 
least three working days prior to the proceeding." 
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court be "timely" notified of any discriminatory result in trial procedure. For example, a 
Florida appellate court declared in an ADA case: 
[U]nder state and federal disability laws, disabled persons are entitled to equal and 
meaningful access to the courts; however, in order to be accommodated such persons 
have the duty no only to make their disabilities known but also to inform the court 
when measures taken to remedy such obstacles are ineffective. The law requires 
diligence of all parties to protect their rights - including the disabled to the extent 
that they are capable of doing so. 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gulisano. 722 So.2d 216, 218 (Fl. App. 1998)(emphasis added). Even 
though Plaintiff had attempted to continue and dismiss the case since the first part of June, 
he never indicated to the trial judge that he was entitled to relief under the ADA. The judge, 
therefore, could not even consider Plaintiffs ADA argument until the jury was in place on the 
morning of trial. 
It is clear that Rohan cannot beet any of the requirement necessary for the Americans 
with Disabilities Act to apply in this case. This Court must, therefore, reject Plaintiffs 
argument that the trial court committed error or abused its discretion in denying his June 19th 
motion. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT PRESERVED PLAINTIFF'S DUE 
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS EVEN IN 
REJECTING HIS MOTIONS TO VOLUNTARILY DISMISS 
THE ACTION OR TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL DATE. 
The Plaintiff, in addition to his other claims, alleges several state and federal 
constitutional violations. The tactic of including alleged constitutional violations is typical. 
This tactic is unjustified and unfair because it imposes to great a burden on the opposing 
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party, as well as the court, "[a] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined 
with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may 
dump the burden of argument and research." Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1997). This is precisely what the Plaintiff has done. He has alleged violations of due 
process, equal protection, the open courts provision, the uniform application of laws 
provision, as well as the fourteen amendment, but failed to support these allegations with any 
reasoning beyond the most basic generalities. It is, therefore, then left to the opposing party 
and the court to martial applicable facts to provide reasoning one way or the other. In effect, 
this tactic allows the burden to be unjustifiably shifted, requiring the opposition to prove that 
everything was constitutional. Under such circumstances, the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that it "may refuse to address a claim of unconstitutionality where the party making the claim 
has failed to make the requisite showing to support the claim." Id . This court should, as the 
court in Jensen did, "decline to address this issue as it is inadequately researched and 
briefed." Id. 
A. The Court Did Not Violate the Plaintiffs Due Process or Equal 
Protection Rights. 
Assuming that the Plaintiffs allegations of constitutional violations are adequately 
researched and briefed in order to be addressed by the court, they are insufficient to show any 
constitutional violation. 
First, there was no violation of the Plaintiffs due process rights. The Plaintiffs fails 
to cite the factors which make up due process, the Utah Supreme Court has held that: 
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[I]n depriving a person of life or liberty, the essentials of due process are: (a) 
the existence of a competent person, body, or agency, authorized by law to 
determine the questions; (b) an inquiry into the merits of the question by such 
person, body or agency; (c) notice to the person of the inauguration and 
purpose of the inquiry and the time at which such person to appear if he wishes 
to be heard; (d) right to appear in person or by counsel; (e) fair opportunity to 
submit evidence, examine and cross examine witnesses; (f) judgment to be 
rendered upon the record thus made. In the absence of a statute laying down 
other or more specific requirements, the above conditions meet the demands 
of due process. 
Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945)(emphasis added). The Plaintiff has 
not alleged that any of these elements were not met, nor has he asserted that any statutorily 
created due process requirements have been violated. Rather, the Plaintiff merely argues that 
because the court did not accept his argument that the ADA applied in this matter his due 
process rights have been violated. This, he claims, "offend[s] the fundamental principle of 
fairness that underpins the judicial process." (Appellants Brief, p.3 8). However, the ADA has 
not been violated and is inapplicable to these circumstances for the reasons previously 
identified. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Violate the Plaintiffs Constitutional Right 
to an Open Court. 
The Plaintiff s next alleged constitutional violation involves the open courts provision 
of the Utah Constitution. This clause of the Utah Constitution states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and not personal 
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this state, 
by himself or counsel, any civil cause which he is a party. 
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Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11. Again, the Plaintiff fails to indicate how this 
provision was violated, but merely states the "denial of his motions and the dismissal with 
prejudice with the imposition of fees and costs, under the facts of this case was neither fair, 
nor were the rules and procedures equally and uniformly applied." (Appellant's Brief, p.39). 
There is no explanation of why the denials were unfair nor is there an explanation showing 
that the rules and procedures were not uniformly applied. 
Furthermore, "the courts have, however, always considered and treated [the open 
court's provision], not as creating new rights, or as giving new remedies where none 
otherwise are given, but as placing a limitation upon the legislature to prevent that branch 
of the state government from closing the doors of the courts against any person who has a 
legal right which is enforceable in accordance with some known remedy." Brown v. 
Wightman, 151 P.2d 366, 367 (Utah 1915)(emphasis added). There is no legislative 
limitation in question in this case, which is what the open courts provision restricts. No 
remedy available to the Plaintiff has been abrogated by the court or the legislature. As the 
court in Wightman said, "courts can only protect and enforce existing rights, and they may 
do that only in accordance with established and known remedies." Id. at 367. The Plaintiffs 
argument, therefore, is without foundation. 
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C. The Trial Court Did Not Violate the Plaintiffs Constitutional Right to 
Uniform Application of the Law, Nor Did the Court Violate the Plaintiffs 
Fourteenth Amendment Rights. 
The Plaintiff now moves on to alleged violations of the uniform application of laws 
provisions of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution. 
Importantly, the Utah Supreme Court in Whitmer v. City of Lindon, stated that "we have 
made clear that Utah's uniform operation of the laws provision is 'at least as exacting, and 
in some circumstances, more rigorous than the standard applied under the Federal 
constitution' [citation omitted] therefore, 'we need only determine whether the ordinances 
in question satisfy Article I, Section 24' of the Utah Constitution. 'If so, they will pass 
[Fourteenth Amendment] Federal muster.'" 943 P.2d 226,230 (Utah 1997); Carrier v. Pro-
Tech Restoration. 944 P.2d 346,356 (Utah 1997). The Plaintiffs uniform application of laws 
claim is unfounded, which necessarily makes the Fourteenth Amendment claim, likewise, 
unfounded. 
Though the trial court found otherwise, the Plaintiff argues that he is disabled under 
the ADA. He then argues, as far as the Defendants can discern, that disabled people are 
discriminated against under Rule 4-105 and Rule 41. That is, however, as much explanation 
as the Plaintiff provides. He does not explain how disabled people are treated differently, 
which is a burden that he must meet. One who assails a legislative classification as arbitrary 
has the burden of proving it to be such. See, State v. J.B.&R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 UT 523, 
116 P.2d 766 (1941). Furthermore, one page later, the Plaintiff specifically states that, in fact, 
41 
he was not treated differently than non-disabled people, stating: "the trial court even after 
becoming aware of the appellant's circumstances treated him as any other litigant in spite of 
his reasonable request for a modification..." (Appellant's Brief, p.41-42). 
With such contradictory statements, it is difficult to understand exactly what is being 
argued. In the event, however, that the Plaintiff is arguing that he was treated differently than 
other disabled people, his argument is unpersuasive because it is unsupported by any facts. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ACTED APPROPRIATELY IN 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE 
WHEN PLAINTIFF FAILED AND REFUSED TO TIMELY 
PROSECUTE THE MATTER. 
The trial court dismissal of Plaintiff s case with prejudice and upon the merits was 
appropriate inasmuch as Plaintiff refused to prosecute the matter. It should be noted before 
proceeding further that this Court's consideration of the trial court's decision to dismiss the 
case with prejudice must be viewed independently from the trial court's rejection of 
Plaintiffs requests to dismiss without prejudice or to continue the trial. The trial court was 
still willing and did provide the Plaintiff an opportunity to prosecute the cause subsequent 
to its rejection of Plaintiff s June 19th and earlier motions. Nevertheless, Plaintiff failed to 
move forward at trial. 
This last action was that which resulted in the dismissal. 
Utah case law is clear that the disposition of a motion to dismiss for failure to 
prosecute rests entirely within the sound discretion of the trial court and such a decision will 
not be upset absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Grundmann v. Williams & Peterson. 
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685 P.2d 538 (Utah 1984); Wilson v. Lamber. 613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980). Case law also 
supports the proposition that a dismissal for failure to prosecute may be with prejudice and 
considered an adjudication on the merits. Charlie Brown Const v. Leisure Sports, 740 P.2d 
1368 (Utah App. 1987); Maxfield v. Rushton. 779 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah App. 1989). 
The trial court record reflects that the Plaintiffs case was dismissed as a result of 
Plaintiffs failure to prosecute the same. See, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order and Judgment, Pgs. 336-346. The trial court's decision was appropriate considering 
the findings which it made. In evaluating the decision to dismiss with prejudice this Court 
should examine the following factors to see if the trial court abused its discretion. These 
factors include: 
(1) The time elapsed in the case prior to dismissal; 
(2) The opportunity each party had to move the case forward; 
(3) What each party had done to move the case forward; 
(4) What difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other side; and 
(5) Whether injustice may result from the dismissal. 
Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah App. 1989). In evaluating all these factors 
from the findings which the trial court made in this matter, this Court must preserve the trial 
court's discretion in dismissing that matter for failing to prosecute. 
The failure to prosecute which resulted in dismissal essentially occurred on the 
morning of trial. On that date, the parties appeared, and the record indicates that defense 
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counsel was present and prepared to proceed. The Plaintiff was not prepared and upon 
inquiry from the court refused to present his evidence. 
Plaintiff was a party during the entire case. He had ample opportunity to prepare to 
case for trial. The record does not reflect any request that the Plaintiff made of the trial court 
to assist in trial preparation, prior to June 5, 2000, which was denied him. He was not 
restricted in any way from pursuing discovery, witnesses or testimony. Moreover, he was 
never inhibited from changing his legal counsel until he made the request a scant two and 
half weeks before trial. 
The fact of the matter was that Plaintiff had prepared for trial, with the assistance of 
counsel Paul Halliday and Stephen Watkins. An examination of Rohan's witness and exhibit 
disclosures shows over twenty witnesses available to testify at trial as well as a number of 
documents. Yet, during the two year discovery period Plaintiff did not make the effort to 
acquire the one thing he claims he needed most, new trial counsel. 
In a delayed effort to get the new counsel he needed the Plaintiff requested a 
continuance on June 2nd. This was appropriately denied as untimely. However, in a bizarre 
attempt to make the needed delay as important to the trial court as it was to him, Rohan 
discharged his counsel two weeks before trial. In his motions thereafter, Plaintiff attempted 
to argue that he could not proceed to try the case without assistance. The trial court, however, 
seeing that Plaintiff had or created his own crises, required Rohan to proceed with Halliday 
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and Watkins or alone. This resulted in Plaintiff standing before the trial judge the first 
morning of trial indicating that he was unprepared to call any witnesses. 
Had the trial court bought into Plaintiffs stall tactics so late in the proceedings, it 
certainly would have prejudiced the Defendants. As indicated above, the financial cost and 
time to locate and prepare witnesses was significant. A continuance of dismissal without 
prejudice meant Defendants would spend an equal amount in time and money locating and 
preparing new witnesses, as well as apparently deposing Plaintiffs newly anticipated experts. 
According to Plaintiff s affidavits with his new counsel in place it was expected that locating 
and preparing experts would start from scratch. Plaintiff was attempting to witness shop at 
Defendants' expense. There were also direct costs incurred by Jerald Boseman who had 
taken a week off from his dental practice in order to attend the trial. 
The real surprise in this case is that Rohan has attempted to assert any injustice in the 
dismissal at all. How can injustice occur when Plaintiff was the party refusing to put on his 
case the morning of trial? No one prohibited or inhibited his presentation. His argument that 
his lack of legal counsel was an improper restriction by the trial court is baseless. He had 
legal counsel, Watkins and Halliday. He simply did not want to use them. In fact he 
intentionally excluded them knowing trial was to occur in two weeks. Moreover, Plaintiffs 
own skills were sufficient to present his case if need be. Even with own skills available on 
the morning of trial Plaintiff chose not to proceed. 
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It is not injustice for the trial court to require a party to prepare its case in a reasonable 
period of time. Two years is certainly a reasonable period for a party to prepare. It is not 
injustice for the court to refuse delay when a party has been dilatory. It is not injustice for a 
trial court to expect a party to try his own case when that party has intentionally subverted 
his own representation expecting the court to continue or dismiss the matter. 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE 
PLAINTIFF WAS FACTUALLY AND LEGALLY JUSTIFIED. 
In his brief Rohan argues that the trial court erroneously awarded attorney's fees and 
costs to the Bosemans. In the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law issued by the trial court 
July 31, 2000, the Court concluded that "Plaintiffs actions are sanctionable within the 
contemplation under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 and this court's inherent authority to govern 
judicial proceedings and make appropriate sanctions." 
U.C.A §78-27-56 states, "In a civil action, the court shall award reasonable attorney's 
fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought in good faith." Such were the findings and conclusions 
reached by the trial court in this matter. 
Plaintiffs numerous motions and actions of June 2000 certainly lacked merit. He 
made various attempts to influence the trial court as to his need to continue or dismiss the 
trial because of an alleged disability or lack of counsel. Nevertheless, he at all times lacked 
sufficient factual background to support the claims he was making. His motions were 
frivolous, lacking even the suggestion of good cause needed for success. 
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Plaintiffs June 19 motion is a prime example as to his meritless conduct. Alleging 
discrimination by the trial court under the ADA, was baseless for the reasons previously set 
forth. The trial court recognized this fact and set forth conclusions of law indicating that the 
argument was without foundation in law or fact. The conclusions of law also noted that the 
ADA does not require the trial court to issue a continuance or voluntary dismissal. The 
argument was clearly without merit and made frivolously. .See, Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 
149 (Utah 1983). 
Plaintiffs arguments where also made in bad faith. Bad faith exists when party makes 
an effort to hinder or delay others to an action. Id. Plaintiffs conduct during June 2000 was 
the epitome of efforts to hinder or delay the court and the Boseman's from proceeding with 
the case so he could restructure his legal counsel and expert witnesses. He made numerous 
requests that the court continue the trial or dismiss the case without prejudice to cover for his 
own error in failing to timely retain and involve trial counsel. Requests for relief were made 
repeatedly even though the trial court had previously denied the same. Finally, the Plaintiff 
argued again and again that he could not proceed with trial because he did not have 
assistance of counsel. Simultaneously, Rohan himself was reeking havoc on his own case by 
dismissing his legal counsel of two years and failing to bring witnesses to trial to testify. His 
failure to prepare not lack of counsel was the issue. This conduct constitutes bad faith under 
the statute and entitles the Defendants to attorney's fees. Id. 
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Plaintiff also argues in his brief that the trial court did not draw any specific 
conclusions concerning bad faith. Plaintiff is in error. While the court's conclusions of law 
do not specifically identify bad faith by name, conclusion 7 does indicate that Plaintiffs 
actions were sanctionable under U.C.A. §78-27-56. Bad faith is an essential element of that 
statute and is therefore a part of the Conclusions of Law. 
POINT V: PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL UNDER 
RULE 59(a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Subsequent to the trial court's entry of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order and Judgment, which occurred on July 31,2000, Rohan requested the court grant him 
a new opportunity to try his case pursuant to Rule 59(a) or amend the July 31, 2000 Order 
to dismiss the case without prejudice under 59(e). The court denied Plaintiffs request. The 
granting or denial of such a motion is within the discretion of the trial judge. Thorley v. 
Kolob Fish Club. 13 Utah 2d 294, 373 P.2d 574 (1962). Plaintiff maintains the burden of 
proof to show the evidence is insufficient to sustain the trial court's order when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the ruling. Tingev v. Christensen. 987 P.2d 588 (Utah 1999). 
Before the trial court could even consider granting a new trial Plaintiff had to 
demonstrate that one or more of the causes identified in Rule 59(a) existed. The causes which 
Plaintiff indicates existed in the July 31, 2000 ruling was: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order 
of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from 
having a fair trial; and 
(7) Error in law. 
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Rohan argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his various motions 
filed throughout June 2000. Each of the motions requested the trial court either grant a 
continuance of the trial or permit Plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss his case without prejudice. 
However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion as previously discussed above. 
Each motion to continue or dismiss which Plaintiff filed was done for the purpose of 
substituting in new counsel of his choice and allowing new counsel to prepare for trial. The 
court correctly concluded that Rohan had been dilatory in getting new counsel aboard and 
up to speed. The court recognized that Rohan had adequate counsel in Halliday and Watkins. 
Finally, the court rightly perceived that such a request a few days before trial would impose 
a substantial burden of time and cost on both the Defendants and the court. All these reasons, 
in addition to the arguments set forth above, provided the trial judge sufficient rationale to 
deny Plaintiffs motions. 
The majority of Rohan's "error of law argument" centers around the trial court's 
refusal to apply the Americans with Disabilities Act in providing Plaintiff with the 
continuance or dismissal he requested. Bosemans do not intend to reargue the entire issue of 
the ADA as it pertains to Plaintiffs motions to continue or dismiss; however, as previously 
discussed, the Act did not apply at that time, nor does it apply to Rohan's Rule 59(a) motion. 
Plaintiff is not a qualified person with a disability. Rohan fails to meet the eligibility 
requirements imposed for receiving a new trial. In order to be a "qualified person" under the 
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ADA Rohan must meet those eligibility requirements with or without modifications to the 
rules. 
Rohan also received complete and total access to the court system. He was provided 
an opportunity to pursue justice and have the jury hear his complaints. Even as late as the 
morning of July 20,2000, with the jury present, the trial judge gave Plaintiff the opportunity 
to put on his witnesses. He failed to do so. 
Finally, the evidence indicates that any denial of access to the judicial process did not 
result from the Plaintiffs disability. All limitations, if any occurred as a result of Plaintiffs 
failure to timely prepare and prosecute his case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants/Appellees Chad and Jerald Boseman 
respectively request that this Court reject Plaintiffs appeal of the trial court's dismissal of 
his case and sustain the decisions of the trial court previously rendered. 
DATED and SIGNED this £}± dly of October, 2001. 
JEFFS, P.C 
)NEY WZ RIVERS 
attorney forfr)efendants/A|)pellees 
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376 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ADDENDUM "A 
78-27-54 JUDICIAL CODE 
nance of a ski run that was alleged to create a fact, precluding summary judgment, as to 
hazard to skiers. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, whether a ski area operator was negligent in 
808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991). not supervising its employees in regard to the 
_ . . . practice of reckless skiing. Clover v. Snowbird 
-Supervision of employees.
 S M j ^ o ^ , 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991). 
Evidence raised a genuine issue of material 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah's Inherent Risks 
of Skiing Act: Avalanche from Capitol Hill, 1980 
Utah L. Rev. 355. 
78-27-54. Inherent risks of skiing — Trail boards listing 
inherent risks and limitations on liability. 
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more prominent locations 
within each ski area which shall include a list of the inherent risks of skiing, 
and the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as defined in this act. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 4. 
Meaning of "this act." — See note following 
same catchline in notes to § 78-27-51. 
78-27-55. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 78-27-55 (L. 1979, ch. skiing and the statute of limitations on such 
166, § 5), relating to notice requirements in action, was repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 43, § 1. 
case of injury arising from the inherent risks of 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or de-
fense in bad faith — Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action 
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under 
Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a 
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action 
before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under 
the provisions of Subsection (1). 
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1; 1988, ch. 92, 
§ 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Essential elements. 
. Findings. 
A PP e a L Hearing. 
- Frivolous appeal. Paralegal services. 
Breach of covenant of good faith by insurer. State of mind. 
Discretion of court. "Without merit" and "good faith." 
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Advisory jury 
—Equity 
When there is a demand for a jury trial in an 
equity case, the jury will serve only in an 
advisory capacity unless both parties have 
clearly consented to accept a jury verdict. 
Romrell v. Zions First Natl Bank, 611 P.2d 392 
(Utah 1980). 
Trial court did not commit prejudicial error 
by allowing a jury to sit in an equity proceeding 
where the jury was retained merely as an 
advisory jury to consider the sole question of 
the reasonableness of plaintiff's reliance on 
defendant's act. Tolboe Constr. Co. v. Staker 
Paving & Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 843 (Utah 1984). 
—Notice to parties. 
In an action involving both legal and equita-
ble issues, where both parties demanded a jury 
trial without limiting their demand to particu-
lar claims, trial court should have notified the 
parties before the trial began of its intention to 
consider the jury advisory; it could not deem 
the jury's verdict advisory and nonbinding after 
the trial without such notice. Goldberg v. Jay 
Timmons & Assocs., 896 P.2d 1241 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). 
Trial by consent. 
—Equity. 
Motion for directed verdict. 
Where the case was essentially one in equity 
but the parties and court appeared to have 
consented to presenting their case to a jury 
whose verdict would have "the same effect as if 
trial by jury had been a matter of right," under 
Subdivision (c), the determination of whether a 
directed verdict was proper was to be tested by 
the same rules governing cases at law. Willard 
M. Milne Inv. Co. v. Cox, 580 P.2d 607 (Utah 
1978). 
Trial by court. 
—Waiver of bench trial. 
Even though former statute providing for 
trial by court in absence of demand for jury was 
couched in mandatory terms, and a party might 
have an absolute right to have the issues tried 
by the court, the right could be waived, as by 
proceeding to trial before a jury. Houston Real 
Estate Inv. Co. v. Hechler, 47 Utah 215, 152 P. 
726 (1915). 
—Waiver of jury trial. 
Where it did not appear that any demand for 
a jury trial was made, or that any objection or 
exception was made at any time during trial 
agamst right of the court to try the case without 
a jury, it would be presumed on appeal that a 
trial by jury was waived. Perego v. Dodge, 9 
Utah 3, 33 P. 221 (1893), aff'd, 163 U.S. 160,16 
S. Ct. 971, 41 L. Ed. 113 (1896). 
Trial by jury. 
—Absence of demand. 
Court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
jury trial to defendant, under this rule, over 
plaintiffs objections although defendant had 
not made proper demand for jury trial under 
Rule 38, where plaintiff was not prejudiced 
thereby. James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2d 
210, 390 P2d 127 (1964). 
—Quiet title action. 
This rule gives the right to have any legal 
issue of fact tried by a jury upon proper de-
mand, and plaintiff in an action to quiet title to 
mining claims was entitled to a jury trial on 
issues of fact. Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 
327 P.2d 250 (1958). 
Cited in Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 
Utah 2d 18, 305 R2d 480 (1956); Peirce v. 
Peirce, 2000 UT 7, 994 R2d 193. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury §§ 61, 
69; 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 714 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 50 C.J.S. Juries §§ 98 to 105; 88 
C.J.S. Trial §§ 20, 203, 547 et seq. 
A.L.R. — When does jeopardy attach in a 
non-jury trial, 49 A.L.R.3d 1039. 
Discretion of district court under Rule 39(b) 
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizing 
it to order jury trial notwithstanding party's 
failure to make seasonable demand for jury, 6 
A.L.R. Fed. 217. 
Rule 40. Assignment of cases for trial; continuance. 
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts shall provide by rule for the 
placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1) without request of the parties or 
(2) upon request of a party and notice to the other parties or (3) in such other 
manner as the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to actions 
entitled thereto by statute. 
(b) Postponement of the trial Upon motion of a party, the court may in its 
discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, including the payment of cost§ 
occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon good 
cause shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence of evidence, 
such motion shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence expected to be 
obtained and shall show that due diligence has been used to procure it. The 
court may also require the party seeking the continuance to state, upon 
affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and if the adverse 
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party thereupon admits that such evidence would be given, and that it may be 
considered as actually given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, 
the trial shall not be postponed upon that ground. 
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present If required by the adverse party, 
the court shall, as a condition to such postponement, proceed to have the 
testimony of any witness present taken, in the same manner as if at the trial; 
and the testimony so taken may be read on the trial with the same effect, and 
subject to the same objections that may be made with respect to a deposition 
under the provisions of Rule 32(c)(3)(A) and (B). 
(Amended effective April 29, 1999.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend-
ment substituted "Rule 32(c)(3)(A) and (B)" for 
"Rule 32(e)(1) and (2)" in Subdivision (c). 
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivision (a) of this 
Abuse of discretion. 
Postponement. 
—In general. 
—Absence of party. 
—Discretion of court. 
—Inability of counsel to attend trial. 
Unavoidable absence. 
—New theory of case. 
—Procedural delays. 
—Supporting affidavits. 
—Unavailable witness. 
Lack of diligence. 
Need. 
Cited. 
Abuse of discretion. 
Where the plaintiff sought to substitute a 
new expert only after his previously-designated 
expert decided at the last minute not to testify 
and moved to substitute witnesses before the 
discovery completion date, the court could have 
obviated any prejudice by granting a motion for 
a continuance and requiring the plaintiff to pay 
for the expense of deposing the new expert, and 
it abused its discretion in excluding the substi-
tute expert's evidence. Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 
71, 982 R2d 565. 
Postponement. 
—In general. 
Tb grant one party continuance after contin-
uance to the prejudice of the other party would 
be patently unfair. This is especially true when 
such continuances are being granted to the 
plaintiff who has triggered the time constraints 
of litigation by bringing the suit in the first 
place. It is equally unfair to allow a party to 
name new witnesses several days before trial. 
Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
—Absence of party. 
Continuance would not be granted because of 
absence of a party, unless he was a material 
witness, and, if so, the facts expected to be 
proved by him had to be stated under oath, 
unless the oath was waived. It was also neces-
sary that party had used due diligence to be 
present at the trial. McGrath v. Tallent, 7 Utah 
256, 26 P. 574 (1891). 
rule is similar to Rule 40, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Amendment of plead-
ings to conform to evidence, continuance upon, 
U.R.C.P. 15(b). 
Refusal of trial court to postpone trial was 
not abuse of discretion where case was set down 
for trial, and had once before been continued 
because of absence of party who was principal 
witness, and second continuance was sought by 
attorney who was not of record in case. Lancino 
v. Smith, 36 Utah 462, 105 P. 914 (1909). 
Refusal to grant continuance in personal in-
jury case was an abuse of discretion where 
plaintiff was not able to attend the trial be-
cause of his physical condition, there was no 
evidence of malingering by the plaintiff, and 
the plaintiff's testimony was essential to his 
case. Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 
P.2d 375 (1962). 
Defendant was not prejudiced by court's re-
fusal to grant a continuance after defendant 
herself had stated that her illness probably 
would not impair her ability to function at the 
trial other than by causing her some discomfort 
and the trial court made provisions to accom-
modate defendant in case the illness forced her 
to leave suddenly. Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 
585 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
—Discretion of court. 
Denial of motion for continuance was within 
discretion of trial court. Sharp v. Canakis 
Gianulakis, 63 Utah 249, 225 P. 337 (1924). 
Trial courts have substantial discretion in 
decidmg whether to grant continuances. 
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 R2d 1375 (Utah 
1988). 
—Inability of counsel to attend trial. 
The inability of counsel to be present at the 
time set for trial does not necessarily entitle his 
client to a continuance. Griffiths v. Hammon, 
560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
Unavoidable absence. 
When counsel has made timely objections, 
given necessary notice, and has made a reason-
able effort to have the trial date changed for 
good cause, it would be an abuse of discretion 
not to grant a continuance. Griffiths v. 
Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
—New theory of case. 
Continuance could be obtained to develop a 
theory of the case suggested after issue joined 
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and before trial. Tiernan v. Trewick, 2 Utah 393 
(1877). 
—Procedural delays. 
Court properly denied motion for continu-
ance in action based on credit card obligation 
which had been procedurally delayed for two 
and a half years by interrogatories and by 
various motions of the defendant; and although 
trial date had been set for four months, motion 
for continuance was not filed until nine days 
before trial. First Sec. Bank v. Johnson, 540 
R2d 521 (Utah 1975). 
—Supporting affidavits. 
Subdivision (b) does not require affidavits to 
accompany a motion for continuance. Bairas v. 
Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375 (1962). 
—Unavailable witness. 
Lack of diligence. 
Where subpoena for absent witness was not 
placed in hands of an officer for service until the 
morning the case was called for trial, though it 
had been set for several weeks, and the witness 
had testified at a former trial, continuance was 
denied. Corporation of Members of Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Watson, 30 
Utah 126, 83 P. 731 (1906). 
In malpractice action, motion for continuance 
based on plaintiff's inability to serve subpoena 
on vacationing medical witness was properly 
denied, where plaintiff had made no effort to 
depose witness and had never contacted wit-
ness for the purpose of testifying. Maxfield v. 
Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975). 
After plaintiff had been granted one contin-
uance because of unavailability of her preferred 
expert witness, and her second request for a 
continuance several months later was solely 
due to her own failure to retain and designate a 
new expert witness in a timely manner, there 
was no abuse in the district court's denial of 
plaintiff's second motion. Hill v. Dickerson, 839 
P.2d 309 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Need. 
Where the defendant's counsel had three 
weeks to prepare for trial, and where two of the 
witnesses, purportedly important to his case, 
were actually present at trial and thus subject 
to cross-examination, the purely speculative 
need for a third witness did not entitle the 
defendant to the granting of a motion for con-
tinuance. State v. Humpherys, 707 P.2d 109 
(Utah 1985). 
Cited in Thorley v. Thorley, 579 R2d 927 
(Utah 1978); Holbrook v. Master Protection 
Corp., 883 P.2d 295 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am, Jur. 2d. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Continuance 
§ 1 et seq.; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial §§ 76, 80, 83, 
84. 
C.J.S. — 17 C.J.S. Continuances § 1 et seq.; 
88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 18 to 35. 
A.L.R. —Admissions to prevent continuance 
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
sought to secure testimony of absent witness in 
civil case, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272. 
Continuance of civil case as conditioned upon 
applicant's payment of costs or expenses in-
curred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66(i), and of 
any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without 
order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the 
adverse party of an answer or other response to the complaint permitted under 
these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal, the dismissal is 
without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court 
of the United States or of any state an action based on or including the same 
claim. 
(2) By order of court Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of dismissal 
under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action may only be 
dismissed at the request of the plaintiff on order of the court based either on: 
(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in the action; or „ 
(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a 
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of 
the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the 
defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for indepen-
dent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a 
dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof For failure of the plaintiff to 
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, 
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in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation 
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the 
event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that 
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court 
as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the 
plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the 
evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the 
court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its 
order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and 
any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, 
operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The provi-
sions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to 
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at the 
trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once dis-
missed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including the 
same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order for the 
payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem proper and 
may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has complied with the 
order. 
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. Should a party 
dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, pursu-
ant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provisional remedy has been allowed 
such party, the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional remedy 
must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party against whom 
such provisional remedy was obtained. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment rewrote Subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2). 
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a) to (d) 
of this rule are similar to Rule 41, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Adoption proceedings. 
Conversion of motion for directed verdict. 
Costs of previously dismissed action. 
—Attorney fees. 
Counterclaim. 
—Lack of prosecution. 
Involuntary dismissal. 
—Appeal. 
Standard of review. 
Time limits. 
—Directed verdict distinguished. 
Findings and conclusions. 
—Effect. 
—Evidence to be considered. 
-^-Federal rules. 
—Form. 
—Grounds. 
Failure to establish prima facie case. 
Failure to join indispensable party. 
Failure to prosecute. 
* Failure to replace counsel. 
Insufficient evidence. 
Lack of jurisdiction. 
—Improper venue distinguished. 
—Prejudice. 
•—Procedure. 
—Reinstatement of dismissed count. 
—Water appropriation cases. 
Uncontested proceedings. 
Voluntary dismissal. 
—Action pending in another state. 
—Conditions. 
Appeal. 
Payment of attorney's fees. 
—Court's discretion. 
—Laches. 
—Two-dismissal rule. 
Second dismissal. 
Quashing of previous summons. 
Cited. 
Adoption proceedings. 
Even if adoption proceedings are "special 
statutory proceedings" under Rule 81(a), this 
rule is not inherently inapplicable to adoption 
proceedings. Thiele v. Anderson, 1999 UT App 
56, 975 P.2d 481. 
A plaintiff's voluntary dismissal under this 
rule rendered proceedings in district court a 
nullity, depriving the court of jurisdiction over 
the adoption petition as of the date of the filing 
of the dismissal notice. Thiele v. Anderson, 1999 
UTApp56,975P.2d481. 
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been lost, the court in which such judgment was recovered may, upon motion 
and satisfactory proof, authorize the attorney of the judgment creditor to 
satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring the same satisfied and direct 
satisfaction to be entered upon the docket. 
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction of judgment, duly executed 
and acknowledged, the clerk shall file the same with the papers in the case, 
and enter it on the register of actions. He shall also enter a brief statement of 
the substance thereof, including the amount paid, on the margin of the 
judgment docket, with the date of filing of such satisfaction. 
(d) Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall have been satisfied, in 
whole or in part, or as to any judgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered 
upon the docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the extent of such 
satisfaction, be discharged and cease to be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction, 
if any execution shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such execution 
shall be endorsed with a memorandum of such partial satisfaction and shall 
direct the officer to collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only from the 
judgment debtors remaining liable thereon. 
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other counties. When any satisfaction 
of a judgment shall have been entered on the judgment docket of the county 
where such judgment was first docketed, a certified transcript of satisfaction, 
or a certificate by the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with the 
clerk of the district court in any other county where the judgment may have 
been docketed. Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall be 
made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall have the same effect as 
in the county where the same was originally entered. 
Compiler's Notes. — There is no federal 
rule covering this subject matter. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Acceptance of full payment. Attachment. 
Effect. Court had duty to make order directing par-
Attachment ^a* satisfaction of judgment to extent of money 
' collected through attachment proceeding, 
Vacation of satisfaction.
 B l a k e v F a r r e l l j 3 1 u t a h 1 1 0 j 8 6 p 8 0 5 ( 1 9 0 6 ) 
Acceptance of full payment. Vacation of satisfaction. 
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed 
Effect. by judgment creditor cannot be vacated without 
When plaintiff voluntarily accepted full pay- a c t i o n a n d hearing in equity, and the lien of an 
ment of a judgment in his favor, the satisfaction attorney against the proceeds of the judgment 
and discharge operated to satisfy and discharge d o e s n°*> include his personal right to execute 
everything merged in and adjudicated by the against the judgment debtor. Utah C.V. Fed. 
judgment. Sierra Nev. Mill Co. v. Keith O'Brien Credit Union v. Jenkins, 528 R2d 1187 (Utah 
Co., 48 Utah 12, 156 P. 943 (1916). 1974>-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of 
§ 1004 et seq. judgment against one joint tort-feasor as re-
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584. lease of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181. 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted 
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
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law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any 
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented 
from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have 
been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any 
question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by 
chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit 
of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the applica-
tion, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under 
the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or 
that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 
10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made 
under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. 
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served 
with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within 
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or 
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period 
not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties 
by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the 
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 59, F.R C.P 
Cross-References. — Harmless error not 
ground for new trial, Rule 61. 
Abandonment of motion. 
Accident or surprise 
Arbitration awards. 
Burden of proof. 
Caption on motion for new trial 
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict. 
Correction of record. 
Costs. 
Decision against law. 
Discretion of trial court. 
Effect of order granting new trial. 
Effect of untimely motion. 
Evidence. 
—Insufficiency. 
—Sufficiency. 
Excessive or inadequate damages. 
—Punitive damages. 
Failure to object to findings of fact. 
Juror's competency as witness as £o validity 
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence, 
Lot Rule 606. 
Failure to order discovery. 
Filing of affidavits. 
Grounds for new trial. 
—Particularization in motion. 
Improper statement by counsel. 
Incompetence or negligence of counsel. 
Misconduct of jury. 
Motion to alter or amend judgment. 
Motion to be presented to trial court. 
Newly discovered evidence. 
New trial on initiative of court. 
Procedure for questioning grant of new trial. 
Reconsideration of motion for new trial. 
Sanctions. 
Settlement bars appeal. 
Summary judgment. 
Time for motion. 
Tolling time for appeal. 
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(9) No attorney fees awarded pursuant to this rule, nor portion thereof, may 
be shared in violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4. 
(Added effective March 31, 1992; amended effective November 15, 1995.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Construction Construction with other rules. 
Construction with other rules The trial court's decision denying plaintiff's 
, request for attorney fees was reversed and 
Construction. remanded for a determination of an award of 
Attorney-fee-augmentation motions under
 r e a s o n a b l e a t t f e e s p u r s u a n t t o Rule 
Subdivision (6) are not conclusively governed
 4_5Q5 w h e r e ^ r e c Q r d w & g ^ ^ rf ^ 
by the fee schedule since the language m the ^
 u s e d ^ fee g c h e d u l e m R u l e 4_m 
subdivision is very broad and does not mention .
 c ,, c , , x 
, ,
 J
 j
 u ., i j , merely as one of the factors in arriving at its 
any restrictions imposed by the schedule , .-. , ,v ... n . -, , 
N A R, Inc v Farr, 2000 UT App 62, 997 P2d d f ™ t h a t th<; attorney fees requested by 
rwo plaintiff were not to be awarded, or whether the 
Subdivision (6) of this rule, which deals with t n , a l «""? b e l i e v e / t h a t * u ] e ^ J } 5 01 w f t h e 
attorney fees incurred before judgment, does sole ™ e c ^ f ? L t o A a w a ^ *??*? ' A *> I n c v 
not affect the implementation of Subdivision M a r ^ e k - 2 0 0 0 U T APP 300> 1 3 P 3 d 6 1 2 
(5), which deals with attorney fees incurred 
post-judgment N A R, Inc v Farr, 2000 UT 
App 62, 997 P2d 343. 
Rule 4-506. Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure and criteria for withdrawal of counsel in 
civil cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all counsel in civil proceedings in trial courts of 
record except guardians ad litem and court-appointed counsel. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Withdrawal requiring court approval Consistent with the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, an attorney may withdraw as counsel of record only 
upon approval of the court when a motion has been filed and the court has not 
issued an order on the motion or after a certificate of readiness for trial has 
been filed. Under these circumstances, an attorney may not withdraw except 
upon motion and order of the court. 
(2) Withdrawal not requiring court approval. If an attorney withdraws 
under circumstances where court approval is not required, the notice of 
withdrawal shall include a statement by the attorney that no motion has been 
filed on which the court has not issued an order and that no certificate of 
readiness for trial has been filed. 
(3) If an attorney withdraws as counsel of record, the withdrawing attorney 
must serve written notice of the withdrawal upon the client of the withdrawing 
attorney and upon all other parties not in default. A certificate of service must 
be filed with the court. If a trial date has been set, the notice of withdrawal 
shall include a notification of the trial date. 
(4) If an attorney withdraws, dies, is suspended from the practice of law, is 
disbarred, or is removed from the case by the court, opposing counsel shall 
serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel on the unrepresented client. The 
Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel must inform the unrepresented client of 
the responsibility to appear in a court or appoint counsel. A copy of the Notice 
to Appear or Appoint Counsel must be filed with the court. No further 
proceedings shall be held in the case until 20 days have elapsed from filing of 
the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel unless the client of the withdrawing 
attorney waives the time requirement or unless otherwise ordered by the 
court. 
(5) Substitution of counsel. An attorney may replace the current counsel of 
record by filing and serving a notice of substitution of counsel. Filing a 
substitution of counsel enters the appearance of new counsel of record and 
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effectuates the withdrawal of the attorney being replaced. Where a request for 
a delay of proceedings is not made, substitution of counsel does not require the 
approval of the court. Where new counsel requests a delay of proceedings, 
substitution of counsel requires the approval of the court as provided in this 
rule. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15,1991; May 15,1994; November 
1, 1997.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment rewrote this rule. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Notice to appoint counsel. Because this rule compels opposing counsel 
Cited. to file a required notice and also directs the 
Notice to appoint counsel. trial court to wait 20 days after that filing before holding further proceedings, the court Defendant's failure to give notice to plaintiff
 e r r e d b gtrM a w i f e , s l e a d ^ d l a c i 
of ite responsibility to appoint counsel under
 h e r ^ d e f e u l t a f t e f h g r c o u n s e l > s mQ_ 
Subdivision (3) before filing its motion to dis- ,. , ., ,
 T ° , ° u l n r t r t 
, , ., . r JA. * • i -i. x tion to withdraw. Loporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 
miss rendered it improper for the trial court to TTT<A 17^ 982 P2d *>ftfi 
dismiss plaintiff's action, notwithstanding the PP > • 
inordinate period of inactivity that preceded Cited m Jeschke v. Willis, 811 R2d 202 (Utah 
defendant's motion to dismiss. Hartford Leas- Q^ ^ D p 199-n 
ing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
Rule 4-507. Disposition of funds on trustee's sale. 
Intent: 
lb establish a uniform procedure for filing trustee affidavits of deposit and 
claimant petitions for adjudication of priority in trustee's sales. 
To establish a uniform procedure in determining the disposition of funds on 
trustee's sales. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) At the time of depositing with the Clerk of the Court any proceeds from 
a trustee's sale in accordance with Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-29, the trustee 
shall file an affidavit with the clerk setting forth the facts of the deposit and a 
list of all known claimants, including known addresses. The clerk shall notify 
the listed claimants within 10 days of receiving the affidavit of deposit. 
(2) Any claimant may then file a petition for adjudication of priority to these 
funds and request a hearing before the court. The petitioner requesting the 
hearing shall give notice of the hearing to all claimants listed in the trustee's 
affidavit of deposit and any others known to the petitioner. All persons having 
or claiming an interest must appear and assert their claim or be barred 
thereafter. 
(3) Pursuant to the determination hearing, the court will establish the 
priorities of the parties to the trustee's sale proceeds and enter an order with 
the clerk of the court or county treasurer directing the disbursement of funds 
as determined. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in 2793 S. 3095 W. v. Munford, 2000 
UTApp 116, lP.3d 1116. 
Rule 4-508. Unpublished opinions. 
Intent: 
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parties stating that absent a showing of good cause by a date specified in the 
notification, the court shall dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of 
prosecution. 
(3) Any party may, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, move to 
vacate a dismissal entered under this rule. 
(Amended effective January 15,1990; May 1,1993; May 15,1994; November 1, 
1996; November 1, 1999.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend- answer" for "within 180 days of the filing date" 
ment substituted "within 330 days of the first in Subdivision (2). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Effect of dismissal, is the concept that plaintiff should have notice 
Good cause. of a court's consideration of dismissal before a 
Source of rule, matter is dismissed and also should have an 
. , opportunity to show good cause why this should 
Effect of dismissal. not occur. Preuss v. Wilkerson, 858 R2d 1362 
If a trial court wishes to dismiss a case with
 ( l g 9 3 ) ( d e d d e d b e f o r e 1 9 9 4 a m e n d m e n t ir_ 
prejudice for failure to prosecute, the trial court . ,.£ ,. , ,. N n 
r J
, i • J x i.u J. J- • i • -i-i. mg notification to parties), 
must expressly indicate that dismissal is with b * 
prejudice or pursuant to U.R.C.P, 41(b); other- ~ „ , 
wise, the dismissal is presumed to be without
 ml . , *, ,.„ . , . 
prejudice under this rule. Panos v. Smith's Food , 1 ^ 7 ? m e l e l f C.?dlf ieS a n m h e r e n t p o w f 
& Drug Ore., 913 P.2d 363 (Utah Ct. App. f * e , t n a i c o u r t to diainias a case sua sponte 
1996) prosecution under R. Civ. P. 41(b). 
Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State Univ. Dept. 
Good cause. of Agriculture, 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 
Implicit in "absent a showing of good cause" 1991). 
Rule 4-104. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Rule 4-104, providing for re- November 1, 1999. For comparable provisions, 
quests for trial setting, was repealed effective see Rule 16, U.R.C.P. 
Rule 4-105. Continuances in special circumstances. 
Intent: 
To establish uniform procedures governing the granting and denial of 
continuances in civil and criminal cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the trial courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) In civil law and motion matters, except orders to show cause and bench 
warrants, matters may be continued upon stipulation of the parties and notice 
to the clerk of the judge to whom the case is assigned, except that when a 
matter has been placed upon the official law and motion calendar, the matter 
may be continued only upon approval of the court. 
(2) In sexual abuse cases involving minor victims, continuances may be 
granted upon a written finding by the court, or written minute entry which 
shall include the reason(s) for the continuance. 
(3) A motion to continue made on or within 10 days prior to the date of a 
hearing may be granted by the court upon a showing of good cause and upon 
such conditions as the court determines to be just, including but not limited to 
the payment of costs and attorney fees. 
(4) If the hearing is an "important criminal justice hearing" or an "important 
juvenile justice hearing" as defined by § 77-38-2 of which the victim has 
requested notification, the court should consider the impact of the continuance 
upon the victim. 
(Amended effective November 15, 1995.) 
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against labor organization for employer's potential 
liability under ADA (42 USCS §§ 12101 et seq.)-
Lane v United States Steel (1994, ND Ala) 871 F 
Supp 1434, 8 ADD 247, 3 AD Cas 1605, 66 BNA 
FEP Cas 902, 149 BNA LRRM 3043. 
43. Preliminary injunction 
In action by applicant to hospital's pediatric 
residency program alleging that hospital violated 
Rehabilitation Act (29 USCS §§ 794 et seq.) and 
ADA (42 USCS §§ 12101 et seq.) by refusing to 
admit him because of his visual disability, appli-
cant was not entitled to preliminary injunction to 
force his admission to program, since he had failed 
to establish some likelihood of success on merits in 
that he had failed to meet his threshhold burden of 
establishing that he was disabled within meaning 
of statutes. Roth v Lutheran Gen. Hosp. (1995, 
CA7 111) 57 F3d 1446, 11 ADD 288, 4 AD Cas 
936. 
44. Reinstatement 
Where unlawful discrimination resulted in dis-
charge, preferred remedy is reinstatement with 
reasonable accommodation; thus, where employee 
who suffered from migraine headaches was fired by 
county public works department for excessive ab-
sences, employee is to be reinstated, and county 
must accommodate his disability by allowing him 
to use vacation time without prior notice for ill-
nesses occurring after all his sick time is used. 
Dutton v Johnson County Bd. of Comm're (1994, 
DC Kan) 868 F Supp 1260, 7 ADD 1016, 3 AD 
Cas 1614. 
Where after-acquired evidence concerning em-
ployee's drug use came to light, and such evidence, 
had it been discovered earlier, would have resulted 
in employee's termination, employee will be barred 
from obtaining remedies of either reinstatement or 
front pay should employee ultimately prevail in 
proving that his discharge violated ADA (42 USCS 
§§ 12101 et seq.). McDaniel v Mississippi Baptist 
Medical Ctr. (1994, SD Miss) 869 F Supp 445, 7 
ADD 879, 3 AD Cas 1530, findings of fact/ 
conclusions of law (1995, SD Miss) 877 F Supp 
321, 8 ADD 573, 4 AD Cas 241, affd without op 
(1995, CA5 Miss) 74 F3d 1238, 6 AD Cas 800. 
County sheriff's deputy who received jury ver-
dict in his favor on discriminatory demotion claim 
under ADA Title I (42 USCS §§ 12111 et seq.), 
and who was awarded backpay, compensatory 
damages, and reinstatement, is entitled to be rein-
stated at annual salary of $41,034.83 based on 
testimony of his expert witness regarding deputy's 
salary growth rate, since jury implicitly adopted 
that testimony in calculating backpay award; how-
ever, deputy is not entitled to reinstatement at 
higher rank of corporal because his claim that he 
might have been promoted to corporal but for his 
demotion is too speculative. Kemp v Monge (1996, 
MD Fla) 919 F Supp 404, 16 ADD 839. 
PUBLIC SERVICES 
PROHIBITION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION AND OTHER GENER-
ALLY APPLICABLE PROVISIONS 
§12131. Definition 
As used in this title: 
(1) Public entity. The term "public entity" means— 
(A) any State or local government; 
(B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instru-
mentality of a State or States or local government; and 
(C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter 
authority (as defined in section 103(8) of the Rail Passenger Service Act 
[45 USCS § 502(8)]). 
(2) Qualified individual with a disability. The term "qualified individual 
with a disability" means an individual with a disability who, with or 
without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the re-
moval of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the 
provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility 
requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs 
or activities provided by a public entity. 
(July 26, 1990, P. L. 101-336, Title II, Subtitle A, § 201, 104 Stat. 337.) 
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disability." Pottgen v Missouri State High Sch. 
Activities Ass'n (1994, ED Mo) 857 F Supp 654, 
6 ADD 756, 3 AD Cas 364, revd, remanded (1994, 
CA8 Mo) 40 F3d 926, 7 ADD 378, 3 AD Cas 
1479, reh, en banc, den (1995, CA8 Mo) 1995 US 
App LEXIS 1374. 
Individual who was born with no left hand has 
disability within meaning of Title II of ADA (42 
USCS §§ 12131 et seq.). Stillwell v Kansas City 
Bd. of Police Comm'rs (1995, WD Mo) 872 F 
Supp 682, 7 ADD 723, 3 AD Cas 1828. 
Disabled person is not "qualified" individual 
because she has not been denied any municipal ser-
vices, and therefore she lacks standing to bring ac-
tion alleging that city violated ADA (42 USCS 
§§ 12101 et seq.) by refusing to amend its zoning 
ordinance in order to accommodate proposed 
health care facility for disabled persons. Kessler 
Inst, for Rehabilitation v Mayor of Essex Fells 
(1995, DC NJ) 876 F Supp 641, 8 ADD 837. 
In action by doctor with bipolar illness, alleging 
that state board of medicine violated Title II of 
ADA (42 USCS §§ 12131 et seq.) by refusing to 
reinstate his license which was revoked following 
his conviction for felony, doctor was not "qualified 
individual with disability" within meaning of ADA 
since his mental condition posed threat to public's 
safety if his license were reinstated. Alexander v 
Margolis (1995, WD Mich) 921 F Supp 482, 13 
ADD 1017, affd without op (1996, CA6 Mich) 98 
F3d 1341, reported in full (1996, CA6 Mich) 1996 
US App LEXIS 26738. 
Determination of whether HIV-positive inmate 
is "qualified" to participate in overnights visits 
with his wife must be made on case-by-case basis. 
Bullock v Gomez (1996, CD Cal) 929 F Supp 
1299, 18 ADD 542. 
With respect to complaint alleging that public 
school district has discriminated against student on 
basis of disability, student is qualified person/ 
individual with disability under regulations imple-
menting § 504 of Rehabilitation Act (29 USCS 
§ 794) and ADA Title II (42 USCS §§ 12131 et 
seq.) and therefore entitled to protection of those 
statutes where student (1) is 8-year-old male diag-
nosed as having congenital spina bifida which af-
fects his mobility and some bodily functions; (2) 
uses manual wheelchair which he is learning to 
maneuver by himself; (3) may wear leg braces to 
school, at which time he does some walking with 
walker and standing for periods of time in class-
room; (4) also has (a) hydrocephalus, (b) neuro-
logical deficiencies which affect his cognitive abil-
ity and fine motor skills, and (c) learning disability; 
and (5) is of age when students without disabilities 
are provided educational services under state law. 
In re Whitman-Hanson Regional Sch. Dist. (1993, 
Dept of Education) 4 ADD 399. 
In action challenging state conservatorship laws, 
ward for whom conservator has been appointed in 
accordance with state law does not meet "essential 
requirements" test to be considered qualified indi-
vidual with disability. State ex rel. McCormick v 
Burson (1994, Tenn App) 894 SW2d 739, 7 ADD 
54, app den (Feb 21, 1995). 
Where requirement that child graduate by age 
19 in order to be eligible for state "Aid to Needy 
Families with Children" benefits beyond child's 
eighteenth birthday tended to exclude persons with 
disabilities from qualifying for benefits past their 
eighteenth birthdays, thus violating ADA § 202 
(42 USCS § 12132), extending such benefits to 
families in question until their children reached age 
of 19 was reasonable modification of graduation 
requirement and thus was namdated by ADA. 
Howard v Department of Social Welfare (1994) 
163 Vt 109, 655 A2d 1102, 10 ADD 434, 5 AD 
Cas 1548. 
Person is "qualified" individual with disability 
with respect to licensing if he can meet, with or 
without reasonable modifications, essential require-
ments for receiving such license; consequently, dis-
abled attorney who committed serious misconduct 
was not qualified to be member of state bar, and no 
reasonable modifications were possible. The Flor-
ida Bar v Clement (1995, Fla) 662 So 2d 690, 13 
ADD 179, 20 FLW S553, amd (1995, Fla) 20 
FLW S597 and cert den (1996, US) 134 L Ed 2d 
933, 116 SCt 1829. 
Police officers who retired as result of disabilities 
before they had served for 20 years were not 
"qualified individuals with disabilities" with regard 
to city retirement plan which offered supplemental 
benefits to officers who retired after 20 years of ser-
vice, since disabled officers did not meet essential 
eligibility requirements for receipt of benefit in 
question. Gagliardo v Dinkins (1996) 89 NY2d 62, 
651 NYS2d 368, 674 NE2d 298, 20 ADD 439, reh 
den (1996) 89 NY2d 917, 653 NYS2d 921, 676 
NE2d 503 and reh den (1996) 89 NY2d 917, 653 
NYS2d 920, 676 NE2d 502 and reh den (1996) 89 
NY2d 917, 653 NYS2d 921, 676 NE2d 503. 
§ 12132. Discrimination 
Subject to the provisions of this title, no qualified individual with a disabil-
ity shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or 
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public 
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 
(July 26, 1990, P. L. 101-336, Title II, Subtitle A, § 202, 104 Stat. 337.) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH W. ROHAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CHAD BOSEMAN, a minor; 
JERALD BOSEMAN, an individual, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No.: 980904135 PI 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The above referenced matter came on for trial on June 20, 2000, defendants appeared 
personally and by and through their counsel of record, Stephen J. Trayner and Peter H. Christensen 
of the law firm ofStrong &Hanni, and plaintiff, Joseph W. Rohan, Esq., pro se, appeared personally, 
having discharged his prior counsel, Paul M. Halliday, Jr. and Steven B. Watkins, on June 6, 2000. 
Plaintiff Joseph W. Rohan having filed a renewed Motion for Voluntary Dismissal and Motion for 
Expedited Disposition or Alternatively Motion to Continue Trial Setting to Consider Plaintiffs 
Claims Under the ADA on June 19, 2000, and the court having heard the arguments of counsel, 
having reviewed the pleadings on file, and otherwise being fully apprised in the premises hereby 
makes the following findings of facts and conclusions of law: 
FILED DISTRICT 60URT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 3 1 20 
, SALT OKE 4 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about April 23, 1998, plaintiff, by and through his counsel of record, Paul M. 
Halliday, Jr. and Steven B. Watkins of the law firm of Halliday & Watkins, P. C., filed 
the present suit seeking damages for certain injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff as 
a result of a January 23, 1997 motor vehicle accident. 
2. On or about August 17, 1999, plaintiffs counsel of record corresponded with 
defendant's counsel to indicate plaintiffs desire to cutoff further settlement 
negotiations and to proceed to trial. 
3. On or about August 23, 1999, defendants' counsel corresponded with plaintiffs 
counsel of record to acknowledge plaintiffs desire to move the matter forward to trial 
and further indicated defendants' desire to commence the necessary discovery to 
prepare the case for trial. 
4. On or about January 18, 2000, plaintiff, by and through his counsel of record, filed 
a Certificate of Readiness for Trial. 
5. Plaintiff, Joseph W. Rohan, Esq., is a licensed attorney and is a member in good 
standing of the Utah State Bar. 
6. On March 2, 2000, the court, following a telephonic conference with counsel of 
record, set a four day jury trial for June 20-23, 2000, and further set appropriate 
witness designation deadlines, discovery cutoff date, and a final pre-trial conference 
for June 5, 2000. 
Rohan v Boseman et al 
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7. On or about June 2, 2000, one business day prior to the final pre-trial conference, 
plaintiff filed a Motion for Continuance of Trial Setting, Withdrawal of Counsel, 
Substitution of Counsel, and Enlargement of Discovery. Plaintiffs Motion sought to 
continue the trial, to allow new counsel to substitute for his current counsel, and to 
allow additional time for the filing of Designations of Witnesses, and for an extension 
of discovery. 
8. On June 5, 2000, the court held the previously scheduled final pre-trial conference. 
Defendants appeared by and through their counsel of record, Stephen J. Trayner of 
the law firm of Strong &Hanni, and plaintiff appeared personally and by and through 
his counsel of record, Steven B. Watkins of the law firm oiHalliday & Watkins, P. C. 
9. At the final pre-trial conference, plaintiffs counsel, Steven B. Watkins, Esq., 
requested that the trial date be stricken, that new witness designation dates be 
established, and that new counsel be allowed to substitute. Defendants did not 
actively oppose plaintiffs motion, but did not stipulate to the motion. The court 
indicated at the final pre-trial conference that it would take the matter under 
advisement, but that plaintiff and his counsel should continue to prepare for trial in the 
event that said motion was denied. 
10. On or about June 5, 2000, the court issued its Minute Entry ruling on plaintiffs 
Motion for Continuance of Trial Setting, Withdrawal of Counsel, Substitution of 
Counsel and Enlargement of Discovery, denied plaintiffs Motion for 
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Continuance/Substitution based upon plaintiffs failure to show good cause for such 
a continuance. 
11. On or about June 6, 2000, plaintiff gave notice to the court and defendant's counsel 
that he had discharged Steven B. Watkins and Paul M. Halliday, Jr. and the law firm 
oiHalliday & Watkins, P.C. as his attorneys. 
12. On or about June 7, 2000, plaintiff moved for Voluntary Dismissal and Motion for 
Expedited Disposition under Rule 41(2)(ii) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiffs Motion was supported by his own affidavit and a Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities indicating that plaintiff desired additional time "to find trial counsel 
who could properly prepare a brain injury case", that plaintiffs prior counsel had 
"limited jury trial experience and do not have any experience in trying a brain injury 
case" and that upon dismissal of the case, plaintiff intended to re-file his action. 
13. Defendants opposed plaintiff s Motion for Voluntary Dismissal in part on the grounds 
that plaintiff had voluntarily chosen to discharge his prior attorneys with the law firm 
of Halliday & Watkins, P.C., that plaintiff could claim no surprise with respect to the 
nature of his claims or the degree of experience and competency of his prior 
attorneys, and that defendants would be prejudiced as a result of any further 
continuances in the matter. 
14. On June 14, 2000, the court issued its Minute Entry denying plaintiffs Motion for 
Voluntary Dismissal for the reasons specified in the opposing memorandum of the 
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defendants. 
15. On June 14, 2000, Joseph W. Rohan, pro se, wrote to defendants' attorneys 
indicating his intention to file a petition for interlocutory appeal and stay of the trial 
date. Mr. Rohan's correspondence further indicated, "I also want to inform you that 
whether or not a stay is granted, a trial will not occur on Tuesday and therefore the 
defense does not need to expend time and effort in preparation of trial on that date." 
16. On June 15, 2000, defendants' counsel wrote back to Mr. Rohan indicating their 
intention to continue with their preparations of trial since there was no Order from 
any trial or appellate court indicating that the trial would not occur as scheduled on 
June 20-23, 2000. Defendants' counsel's letter further indicated that defendants 
would not stop their preparations for trial until an appropriate Order was obtained 
staying the trial date or dismissing the case with prejudice and that in the event 
plaintiff failed or refused to move forward with his case at trial, that defendants would 
seek sanctions against plaintiff. 
17. On or about June 15, 2000, plaintiff, Joseph W. Rohan, pro se, filed a "Notice of 
Plaintiffs Inability to Bring this Matter to Trial" indicating "that [plaintiff] cannot 
present his case that is scheduled for trial on Tuesday, June 20,2000 through Friday, 
June 23, 2000." 
18. On June 16,2000, plaintiff wrote to defendants' counsel indicating "I am unable and 
unprepared to try my own brain injury case and that under no circumstances will a 
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trial be held on Tuesday, June 20th" and "both the Court and Defendants (for at least 
the second time) have been notified that this matter will not proceed to trial as 
scheduled." 
19. On or about June 19, 2000, plaintiff filed a renewed Motion for Voluntary Dismissal 
and Motion for Expedited Disposition or Alternatively Motion to Continue Trial 
Setting to Consider Plaintiffs Claims Under the ADA. 
20. On or about June 20,2000, the court entered its Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for 
Voluntary Dismissal without Prejudice. 
21. On June 20, 2000, defendants appeared personally and by and through their counsel 
of record, and were prepared to try the defense of this matter. Plaintiff appeared pro 
se, being unrepresented by other counsel. 
22. As of the first day of trial, June 20, 2000, the court had not entered any order 
permitting withdrawal of counsel under Rule 4-506(1) or (5) of the Rules of Judicial 
Administration. 
23. On the morning of trial, plaintiff appeared unprepared and/or unwilling to proceed 
with the calling of witnesses on his own behalf and stated in open court that he was 
not prepared to proceed with the presentation of his evidence. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts, the court makes the following Conclusions of 
Law: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiffs conduct individually and by and through his prior counsel of record 
demonstrate a clear pattern of failure to prosecute plaintiffs case, and as a result, 
warrants dismissal of plaintiff s complaint with prejudice and upon the merits; 
2. Plaintiff failed to comply with or to make the requisite showing under Rule 4-105(3) 
with respect to his Motions to Continue the Trial in this case in that plaintiff failed to 
show good cause for such a continuance; 
3. Plaintiffs Motions for Substitution of Counsel would have caused a continuance of 
the trial date and failed to comply with or meet the requirements of Rule 4-506(1) and 
(5) of the Rules of Judicial Administration; 
4. That plaintiffs assertion that the trial of this case must be delayed or continued due 
to the provisions of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act is without 
foundation in law or in fact; 
5. The provisions of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act do no require that 
this court grant plaintiffs request for a continuance and/or a voluntary dismissal 
without prejudice; 
6. Plaintiffs failure to prosecute his case under the circumstances present in this case 
resulted in defendants incurring needless costs and fees and therefore, defendants shall 
be entitled to an awards of costs and fees as sanctions because of plaintiffs refusal 
and/or failure to present his case at trial and that said refusal and/or failure was 
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7. 
DATED this 
without merit and in bad faith and was engaged in with an intent to hinder or delay the 
proceedings of this court. 
Plaintiffs actions are santionable within the contemplation under Utah Code Ann. 
§78-27-56 and this court's inherent authority to governjudicial proceedings and make 
appropriate sanctions 
_ (lay of July, 2000. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Joseph W. Rohan, Esq. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH W.ROHAN, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CHAD BOSEMAN, a minor; 
JERALD BOSEMAN, an individual, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 980904135 PI 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
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The above referenced matter came on for trial on June 20, 2000, defendants appeared 
personally and by and through their counsel of record, Stephen J. Trayner and Peter H. Christensen 
of the law firm ofStrong &Hanniy plaintiff, Joseph W. Rohan, Esq., pro se, appeared. At the time 
of trial, plaintiff had pending Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Voluntary Dismissal and Motion for 
Expedited Disposition or Alternatively Motion to Continue Trial Setting to Consider Plaintiffs 
Claims under the ADA. The court having previously made its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of 
Law, now rules as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AD JUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs Renewed Motion 
for Voluntary Dismissal and Motion for Expedited Disposition or Alternatively Motion to Continue 
Trial Setting to Consider Plaintiffs Claims under the ADA being the same is hereby DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that plaintiffs complaint and 
all claims contained therein, whether alleged or not alleged, against the defendants be and the same 
are HEREBY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS DUE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO PROSECUTE HIS CASE, and defendants are thereby granted costs 
of court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that judgment shall be entered 
in favor of defendants and against the plaintiff in the amount of $ I/*'* f°r costs of court 
incurred; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DEGREED that judgment shall be also 
entered in favor of defendants and againsj^ die plaintiff in the amount of $ *fi0&£% in 
attorney's fees and $ fur in other costs as a result of the dismissal of said action and 
plaintiffs willful failure or refusal to proceed with trial. Interest shall accrue upon said judgment from 
the date of this Order until satisfied at the highest rate permitted by law. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND DECREED that plaintiff, Joseph W. Rohan, Esq , shall 
reimburse the clerk of the Third District Court of Salt Lake County for the costs incurred in 
connection with the calling of the jurors in this case in the sum of $518. 
DATED this M ^ y of July, 2000. 
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Distrfct Court Juflge 
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Joseph W. Rohan, Esq. 
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